November Plenum of C. C. of C. P. S. U.
How to Prepare for 7th Congress
The Naval Armaments Race



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SERGEI MIRONOVICH KIROV

By D. Z. MANUILSKY

(Speech delivered in the name of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, December 6, 1934, at the funeral meeting held in the Red Square, Moscow, in memory of the late Comrade S. M. Kirov.)

COMRADES!

Together with the Party, together with the working class of Leningrad, Moscow and Transcaucasia, together with the toilers of all our country, the Communist International is burying today Sergei Mironovich Kirov. This is an enormous and irrecoverable loss. Every one of us is bowed under the heavy burden of sorrow as if under a rock. It cannot be expressed in words. If Bolsheviks could weep, this square would have been flooded today with tears. Bolshevik proletarians, however, cannot weep. The grief of our Party, the grief of the Leningrad workers and that of the toilers of our country is shared by the whole Communist International. Thousands of German proletarians—headed by Comrade Thaelmann—in prisons and concentration camps, the Asturias miners—the heroes of the Spanish October battles—are sharing our grief. Far away, in China, the commanders and men of the Chinese Red Army who are repelling under most difficult conditions the attacks of the Chinese militarists, will dip today their fighting banners.

In the minds of millions of toilers of capitalist countries, Kirov will remain forever as one of the best representatives of our powerful and glorious Party, which steadily and systematically prepared the proletariat, under the underground conditions of the tsarist regime, for the seizure of power, and led the toilers for the victorious attack in October 1917. Kirov will be marked in the history of the Proletarian Revolution as one of the most faithful and best sons of the Party which during the Civil War, at the head of the toilers, defended with its body the October conquests and which showed to the whole world great socialist reorganization of this country.

Kirov will be marked in the minds of the toilers of all countries as a fearless knight of the first Proletarian Revolution, as its fiery tribune, whose voice sounded with great force in the hours of dangers impending over this Revolution in Astrakhan, as well as in the hours of its victories in Leningrad, calling the workers and collective farmers forward to new victories.

Kirov will be noted in the history of the Proletarian Revolution as a representative of the general staff of the Revolution, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., which sets in motion over the valleys and mountains of our vast country the masses of workers and collective farmers who are fighting for socialism and Proletarian Revolution throughout the world.

Kirov will be clearly marked in the minds of the toilers of all countries as the perfect image of a Bolshevik leader, carved, as it were, from one solid piece of granite, who combined in his person all the best features of the proletarian guard molded by Lenin and Stalin, the great masters of the Revolution.

Courage, self-denial, supreme faithfulness to the cause of socialism, sharp-sighted political vigilance, the firm hand of a helmsman and proletarian modesty and simplicity were the principal features of Kirov's brilliant personality. The veins may be opened and the blood drained drop by drop from this proletarian guard, but it will remain faithful to the great cause of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin.

Kirov will be noted in the minds of the toilers of all countries as a son of the people. From a homeless childhood and a charity school, through the hurricane of the October Revolution, he rose to the brilliant position of a leader of the Party and country. With Kirov arose the people who promoted him, arose from the dark of backwardness and stagnation to the position of an advanced people of the world. This people was led by Comrade Kirov, the comrade-in-arms and disciple of the highly gifted Stalin.

Kirov will be noted in the history of the Proletarian Revolution as its martyr, side by side with Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, John Scheer, secretary of the C.C. of the Communist Party of Germany, whose image will inspire the masses of toilers of all countries for the fight against the regime of exploitation and violence which armed the hand of the villainous assassin.

At the Seventeenth Party Congress Kirov declaimed a wonderful poem of great victories. It was heard not only in Moscow, Leningrad and in the remote villages of Transcaucasia. His speech—a song, a hymn of the free labor of our victorious socialist construction—sounds now over the whole world. It sounds in the humming of our socialist machines, it glows in the sparks of our socialist blast furnaces, it hums in the sky in the motors of our socialist planes, and sparkles with the flame of socialist enthusiasm of millions of toilers in our country. This song is heard all over the world. Millions of people are moved by the song and turn their eyes towards the socialism

which Kirov was building. In these hard times of common sorrow millions of hands stretch toward the staff of socialist construction and its leader Comrade Stalin, who has lost in Kirov a faithful comrade-in-arms and friend.

Millions of these toilers say to our Party and country: We are with you! We are with you till the final victory of the cause for which Comrade Kirov fought and perished. We are taking the banner of Kirov into our strong proletarian hands. Drops of his noble blood shine on this banner. Under this banner we will fight, under this banner we will ruthlessly beat the enemy and under this glorious banner we will conquer.

THE C.P.S.U. GAINS A NEW SPLENDID VICTORY

(The decisions of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)

AT the very time when the economy of the capitalist world is falling to pieces, conditions have been created in the U.S.S.R., by a series of consistent and huge achievements, for the *whole* of economic life to advance rapidly.

At the very time when, as a result of tremendous economic difficulties, rationing is being introduced into fascist Germany in respect to the consumption of raw materials, in the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, the bread card system, which has existed for six years, and which played a tremendous part in the heroic period of the First and half of the Second Five-Year Plan, but which has now become a hindrance to further development, is being abolished.

At the very time when there is an uninterrupted process going on in the capitalist countries of the devaluation of the currency, in the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, conditions have been created not only for the consolidation of the Soviet ruble, but also for raising its exchange rate.

At the very time when the cost of living is rising in the capitalist countries, in the U.S.S.R., on the other hand, the policy of reducing prices in *all* branches of the national economy has been given a real and firm basis.

The November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. adopted two most important decisions, which are closely connected with one another. The adoption of both these decisions has become possible only as a result of the final solution of the grain problem based on the advance of Socialist agriculture, the complete victory of the collective farm system in the village, and the fundamental improvement in the practical leadership of the collective farms, and the technical reequipment of agriculture.

The resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee "regarding the abolition of the card system for bread and certain other products" adopted on the report made by Comrade Molotov, and the decision adopted by the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., based on this resolution, have decided the following:

> "That from the first of January, 1935, the card (ration) system in respect to the supply of bread, flour and cereals be abolished, and that the sale of bread and other products to the population be introduced throughout the Soviet Union on a wide scale in State and co-operative shops; that all existing retail sale prices for bread, flour, and cereals be abolished, and that *uniform retail State prices* be introduced for bread, flour and cereals, computed on a definitely fixed scale to correspond to eight territorial regions. These uniform retail State prices are to be higher than the previous 'ration' prices, and lower than the previous 'commercial' prices." (Commercial prices are the prices at which products are sold in the open State stores to all sections of the population and which are higher than the "ration" prices—*Ed.*)

To compensate those who have previously purchased bread at the lower "ration" prices, there is to be an increase from January 1, 1935, onwards, in the wages of workers, office employees, etc., in the stipends received by students, and in pensions received. The total increase in wages in connection with the abolition of the "ration" system is to amount to 4,200,000,000 rubles. This means an increase of more than 10 per cent to the present total wages bill for the year.

To compensate those collective farms, collective farmers and individual peasants who concentrate on the production of agricultural raw materials and deliver them to the State and who have hitherto received bread from the State at reduced "ration" prices, there is now to be an increase in the prices given for these raw materials (flax, cotton, tobacco, fish, fur, etc.) on being delivered to the State. This increase in the prices given for raw materials thus delivered to the State will cost the State, according to Comrade Molotov's report, several billions of rubles.

To correspond with the establishment of new single retail State prices which are higher than the prices paid for bread received on "ration," there is to be an increase, from the beginning of 1935, of 10 per cent in the price of grain paid by the State for

all kinds of grain delivered to the State, and from September, 1935, an increase of 20 per cent in the price of grain purchased by the State and cooperative organizations out of the surpluses left in the hands of the collective farmers, etc.*

This decision meets the interests of the whole of the toiling peasantry of the Soviet Union.

Immediate steps are being taken to extend the number of State and cooperative stores for the sale of bread. By April, 1935, the total number of bread stores is to be increased by not less than 10,000.

Such, in the main, are the decisions of the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. and the corresponding decision taken by the Council of People's Commissars, connected with the abolition of the ration system for bread. Along with the abolition of this "exceptional" form of distribution, the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. also decided to reorganize the Political Departments in the Machine Tractor Stations, which were set up after the January Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. in 1933, "as an exceptional form of organization".

The resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. "regarding Political Departments in agriculture" and adopted following the report made by Comrade Kaganovitch, states as follows:

> "To reorganize the Political Departments of the Machine Tractor Stations into ordinary Party bodies, for which purpose the Political Departments are to be merged with the existing District Party Committees; especially big districts are to be divided up into several new districts, and the corresponding Political Departments are to be merged in them. The leadership over all the primary Party organizations in the districts is to be made the responsibility of the District Party Committee."

* * *

These two most important decisions made by the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. have not yet met with a sufficient response in the world press. The vile murder of Comrade Kirov by an agent of our class enemy made it possible for the bourgeois press to distract the attention of public opinion in the capitalist world for a time from these two noteworthy decisions, decisions which clearly illustrate the rising line of development in the U.S.S.R. as opposed to the ever-growing decay taking place in the capitalist world.

The bourgeois press greedily seized on the news of the murder of Comrade Kirov in order to pour out whole streams of lies and slander against the Soviet Union and to spread the wildest cock-and-bull stories about the disorders alleged to be taking place now in the Soviet Union, and about conflicts allegedly taking place between the Red Army and the G.P.U. These fairy tales have been reprinted in the pages of the Soviet press so as to show the workers and collective farmers of the Soviet Union the real features of their class enemies, to show them how the enemy resorts to lies in order to hide from the masses of the people the growing might of the Soviet Union.

Those responses, however, which do appear in the bourgeois press during the two days which intervened between the publication of the decisions taken by the November Plenum and the publication of the sorrowful news about the assassination of Comrade Kirov, indicate that a considerable section of the bourgeois press were not able to keep silent about the successes of the Soviet Union as manifested in the decisions taken by the November Plenum. Alongside the barefaced anti-Soviet attacks made in connection with these decisions, such as, for instance, were made by the correspondents of the Polish Telegraphic Agency and the *Berliner Berzen-Zeitung*, we very often met during these days with another kind of article in the camp of our class enemies. A *Times* correspondent, for instance, wrote the following:

> "This reform has a fair prospect of success, and may simplify the internal, financial and economic life of the U.S.S.R." (*London Times*, Nov. 30, 1934, p. 15.)

The *Koelnische Zeitung* wrote the following:

> "Collectivization, which now embraces 90 per cent of the land under plow, has fundamentally eased the State resources of grain. At the same time there has been a significant improvement during recent years in the activity of the distributing apparatus."

In connection with the reorganization of the Political Departments this newspaper wrote that "we may speak of a certain normalization of the State apparatus".

M. Just, the Moscow correspondent for the *Deutsche Algemeiner Zeitung*, wrote the following:

> "There has now been such an advance forward again, that efforts are being made to establish

---

* *Ed. Note*: "Grain deliveries" are to be distinguished from the purchases made by the State and co-operative organizations out of the surpluses left in the hands of the collective farmers, etc. "Grain deliveries" are those which each collective farm, individual farm, etc., must deliver in quantities fixed by the government at fixed prices. The "purchases" made by the State and co-operative organizations from the surpluses left in the hands of the collective farmer, etc., are voluntary and can only take place after the full quota of compulsory State deliveries have been made. The prices paid by the State, etc., for such purchases are naturally higher than those paid for grain compulsorily delivered.

certain firm relations between the incomes of the town and the village, and between agricultural and industrial products. The price of the ruble will once again be slowly stabilized."

The Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* wrote the following on December 6:

"After the last increase in the price of bread obtainable on the 'ration' system and the reduction in the price of bread obtainable on the open market, the material importance of the bread (ration) card has become of still more secondary importance. Bread purchased with the 'ration' card does not now cost many times less than, but only half the price of, the bread purchased on the open market in unlimited quantities, and its issue is limited to 400 grams (1 pound) per day for the ordinary citizen, and 800 grams (2 pounds) per day for those engaged in heavy work. This is economy which only plays an important part in the budget of the lower paid categories of workers."

The *Neue Freie Presse* links up the decisions of the November Plenum with the decisions of the Seventeenth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U., and continues as follows:

"The decisions of the last Party Congress have in view a trebling of the consumption of articles of prime necessity during the course of the Second Five-Year Plan. We have to understand this as meaning that while the wages received are to be maintained at their former level, a sharp policy is to be carried through of deflation and of saturating the market with commodities, and this will render it possible for prices to be reduced and for the purchasing power of the Soviet ruble to be raised by three times."

Thus, a number of bourgeois newspapers which are hostile to us cannot hide the big positive consequences of the decisions made by the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U., although they speak of this in a very restrained manner and make all kinds of reservations. But these very newspapers, as though to compensate themselves, attempt to distort the motives which at one time prompted the Soviet government to introduce the card (ration) system, and to distort the *political* meaning of the abolition of the card (ration) system.

M. Just, the correspondent whom we have quoted above, wrote the following in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*:

"The bread card was the direct consequence of the forcible collectivization of the peasant farms."

While we read the following in the article in the *Neue Freie Presse* which we referred to above:

"In the Soviet Union the bread card has had another fate and another importance than the bread card during the period of the world war. Here, they have carried on war against the peasantry, the most important weapon in whose hands was the refusal to deliver grain. Thus, the town population had to ration consumption."

And, regarding the political meaning of the abolition of the card system, this article also states the following:

"Existing resources render it possible to abolish the bread cards. But this measure must be estimated not only from the material point of view. Fundamental and important is the deep political meaning of the weakening of the *class principle* in distribution and the return to supplying the population normally by way of the market. The principle of the legal equality of citizens, as against the class principle, once again makes a step forward."

A similar political estimate of the abolition of the card system, though stated in a wild anti-Soviet tone, is made by the Polish *Illustrowany Kurjer Codzienny* on December 8, according to which the abolition of the bread card system implies:

"The capitulation of compulsory methods directed against the individual, and at the same time implies the complete bankruptcy of the Marxist doctrine and the bankruptcy of the attempt to regulate prices."

Here, we are face to face with a double lie. First, we have the lie regarding the causes making for the introduction of the bread card system. It is not true that the bread cards were the direct consequence of collectivization. Exactly the opposite is true. The bread card began to be introduced in 1928 as a result of the extremely weak development at that time of collectivization, and its abolition has become possible precisely on the basis of the complete victory of the collective farm system. The introduction of the bread card system into the U.S.S.R. was called forth by *difficulties of growth*. It was a most important condition for the improvement in the supplies received by the workers at a time when agriculture was extremely backward. It was called forth by the necessity of fully ensuring that the towns and industrial districts received supplies, and that the most important centers and those who were shock-workers engaged in production should receive preference in supplies, and also that those delivering agricultural raw materials to the State should be supplied with bread at fixed prices, at a time when bread resources were limited and when individual peasant economy lagged very much behind the stormy development of socialist industry. In his report made at the November Plenum

of the C.C. of C.P.S.U., Comrade Molotov stated the following in this connection:

> "Why did we introduce the card system six years ago? Because we wanted to secure the realization of the policy of rapid industrialization of our country, to secure the rate of industrialization adopted by the Party, to secure all this in spite of the extreme backwardness of our agriculture at that time. The whole political situation, internal and international, demanded this of us. This was also necessary in the interests of agriculture itself, in the interests of speeding its technical re-equipment.
>
> "We introduced the card system not at a moment of decline of national economy. No, we had a great rise in industry then also. But the backwardness of small-scale individual peasant agriculture began to threaten this rise of industry. In order not to permit the disruption of industry on account of the backwardness of agriculture, we had to concern ourselves particularly with supplying bread to the workers, to the cities, and also to the agricultural regions supplying raw materials for light industry."

(It will not be out of place to point out that the population of the towns in the U.S.S.R. has more than doubled during the last six years, having increased from 11,000,000 to 23,000,000.)

Comrade Molotov illustrated the difference between the situation in 1929, when, even after the peasantry had already made a turn towards the collective farms, 80 per cent of the grain collected by the State came from individual peasant farms, and this year, 1934, when 92 per cent of the grain which has come to the State has been received from collective and State farms. He further pointed out that the government will now have at its disposal not less than 1,500,000,000 *poods of grain*,* whereas, following the harvest in the year 1928, the grain collections made by the government amounted to 650,000,000 poods in all, *i.e.*, less than half as much as at the present time. In summing up the results of the bread card system, Comrade Molotov stated that: "The introduction of the bread card system was no easy affair. But, as the facts show, we have achieved what we set out to do."

Our bourgeois critics distort the causes that made for the introduction of the bread card system, but still more shamelessly do they distort the political meaning of the abolition of the bread card system. In vain do Messrs. the bourgeois critics hold to the thought that the abolition of the bread card system in the U.S.S.R. allegedly implies "the weakening of the class principle", "the return to bourgeois free trade", and "the bankruptcy of the attempt to regulate prices".

* One pood equals approximately 40 pounds.

> "Soviet trade is trade without capitalists, big or small, trade without speculators, big or small. It is a special kind of trade, the like of which history has not known hitherto, and which only we, the Bolsheviks, carry on in the conditions of Soviet development." (Stalin.)

While this Soviet trade is being developed, at the present stage which does not allow of capitalism being revived and of the private capitalist sector functioning in the sphere of commodity turnover, the Soviet government, which is the main holder of grain supplies destined for sale on the market, will be able, after the abolition of the bread card system, to raise the State regulation of trade onto a much higher level, and to ensure that its policy of price reductions will be operated so as to bring about a further rise in the well-being of the workers and peasant masses. This is as different from the "weakening of the class principle", from the "return to bourgeois free trade", and from the "bankruptcy of the policy of the regulation of prices" as day is from night.

* * *

When fascist Germany, which has now been compelled to ration the consumption of raw materials, will in the near future be compelled to introduce additionally the rationing of consumption, Messrs. De Man and the other social-fascists whose souls are akin to his, will recognize this as "a slice of socialism" just as they consider the measures adopted by Mr. Roosevelt a "slice of socialism". But the Soviet government, which is actually building up real socialism and which introduced the bread card system as a *powerful weapon so as to fulfill successfully the mighty tasks of socialist reconstruction*, never for one moment regarded the bread card system, *even in Soviet conditions*, as a *direct* step to the abolition of money economy, as a direct step to direct socialist exchange of commodities, to socialist distribution.

At the Seventeenth Party Congress, in referring to the "Leftist chatterboxes", Comrade Stalin stated the following:

> "These people, who are as far removed from Marxism as heaven is from earth, evidently do not realize that we shall have money for a long time yet, right up to the time until the first stage of Communism, *i.e.*, until the socialist stage of development, has been accomplished. They do not realize that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy which the Soviet government took over and adapted to the interests of socialism, for the purpose of expanding Soviet trade to the utmost, and so creating the conditions for the direct interchange of products. They do not realize that the interchange of products can replace, and be the result of, a perfectly organized system of Soviet trade, of which we have not a

trace as yet, and are not likely to have for some time."

It is precisely because the Soviet government regarded the bread card system as only a temporary and exceptional form of distribution, and considered that the highway to the direct exchange of products will lead through the development of Soviet trade, that it introduced corrections into the system from the very beginning after the introduction of the bread card system, and later adopted a number of consistent measures which prepared the way for the replacement of the bread card system by free Soviet trade in bread.

As far back as the year 1930, at the Sixteenth Congress of the Party, Comrade Stalin sharply criticized bureaucratic distortions existing in the co-operative trading and supply organizations. In May 1931, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. issued a joint statement in which they set forth the task of the abolition of the mechanical distribution of products and of the bureaucratic obstructions in the way of commodity turnover.

The Seventeenth Party Conference, held in February 1932, made concrete reference to the preparations for the abolition of the bread card system when it stated the following:

> "In assuring a Bolshevik tempo of development of the whole of national economy and better catering to the needs of the broad masses of town and country in the matter of articles of mass consumption, the *development of commodity circulation* is of prime importance . . . the supply of manufactured goods and food products for the workers and rural toilers can improve rapidly only on the basis of enlarging the circulation of commodities. For this purpose, the number of stores and stands, as well as other forms of trade, must increase to the utmost and be provided with the necessary technical equipment. *Only by so doing will the ground be prepared for abolishing the rationing system and for doing away with centralized distribution—which is to be replaced by extensive Soviet trade.*"

The preparations for the abolition of the bread card system took the line of favoring collective farm trading and especially of developing trade by the State in the so-called "commercial" stores. In the spring of 1933, the People's Commissariat of Supplies (Narkomsnab) proceeded to develop a wide network of stores, trading at "commercial" prices. The People's Commissar for Internal Trade, Comrade Weitser, gives data which show the tremendous increase in State "commercial" trading in bread, as follows:

From March 1933 to the end of September 1934, "commercial" trading in baked bread increased from 18,500 tons to 609,600 tons. While the quantity of bread sold at "commercial" prices in the second quarter of 1933 only amounted to 3.2 per cent of the bread distributed by way of "ration" system, in the fourth quarter of the year 1933 on the other hand, the figure had increased to 25.5 per cent, while in the third quarter of 1934, it reached the figure of 39.7 per cent (at the present time it already amounts to 45 per cent).

Side by side with the expansion of "commercial" trading in bread, a gradual planned process has taken place of bringing State "commercial" prices and "ration" prices closer to one another by way of reducing the former and increasing the latter. In 1933 the price of "rationed" rye (black) bread was increased from 12½ kopeks to 25 kopeks per kilogram (about two and one-fifth pounds), and in 1934, the price was further increased from 25 kopeks to 50 kopeks per kilogram. During this period the "commercial" price for rye (black) bread was reduced from 2½ rubles to 2 rubles per kilogram, and later to 1½ rubles per kilogram. In a still greater measure (1 ruble 20 kopeks, and 3 rubles) has the process of bringing closer together the prices for wheat (brown) bread taken place.

The importance of State "commercial" trading has grown rapidly, both in relation to its influence on the price level in collective farm trading, and its cultural effect on trading by the co-operative stores, as well as in relation to its importance in the total amount of commodity turnover. While, two or three years ago, the Consumers' Co-operatives were predominant in the towns, and held an almost complete monopoly of trade, at the present time the proportion of State trading in the towns amounts to 64.7 per cent of the total commodity turnover, while the proportion of co-operative trade in the towns is 34.6 per cent of the total town turnover.

While favoring the development of State "commercial" trading, and the competition of the latter against other forms of trade, the Soviet government thereby prepared the way for the abolition of the bread card system and its replacement by Soviet trading on a broad scale, in which the dominating role will be played by State trading. But the main thing that prepared the way for the abolition of the card system was the final solution of the grain problem, as a result of which we read the following in the resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C.:

> "*The State now has at its disposal a sufficiently large quantity of grain to enable it to ensure completely and unconditionally that the population will receive supplies without the use of the card system, by way of the all-round development of trade in bread on a wide scale.*"

This tremendous achievement was the result of the final victory of the collective farm system and of its consolidation organizationally and economically, and of the technical re-equipment of agriculture.

"The 220,000 collective farms, the 300,500 Machine Tractor Stations and the 5,000 State farms which now exist, now have at their disposal 281,000 tractors, 33,000 combines, 34,000 trucks, 845,000 horse and tractor sowing machines, 129,000 multiple and semi-multiple threshers, 2,085,000 different kinds of machines for harvesting, grain and technical cultures, (mowing machines and flax sorters, etc.). In 1933 the tractors owned by the Machine Tractor Stations (M.T.S.) carried out tasks which, in terms of tillage, amounted to 35,000,000 hectares* (without threshing) and in 1934 55,000,000 hectares. In 1933, combines in the collective farms harvested 533,000 hectares and in 1934, 1,576,000 hectares. The quality of agricultural work done has improved (tillage, harvesting, etc.). In 1934 the plan for grain deliveries to the State was fulfilled 1½ months earlier than in 1933, *i.e.*, three months earlier than in 1932. Millions of collective farms have become imbued with the understanding of the necessity for fulfilling their obligations to the State before all else." (Resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)

The Soviet government made tremendous efforts, with the result that the grain harvest in the Soviet Union, as distinct from previous times, no longer depends "on God". It is precisely for this reason that we may consider that the population will now be adequately supplied with grain in the future. The harvest gathered in 1934 bears clear witness to this. This year, as is well known, drought raged over a very big area, the lower Volga Region, North Caucasus, and the Steppe Region in the Ukraine. In spite of that fact, according to preliminary data received from the Central State Harvesting Commission regarding the harvest of grain for the year 1934, the yield of grain this year at the time of the harvesting was approximately on a level with last year. And thanks to the decline in losses during the harvesting process, which on previous occasions constituted quite a high percentage of the total harvest, the population this year will have between 250 and 300 million poods more grain at its disposal than last year. As regards grain resources for the coming year, when the card system will no longer be in existence, Comrade Molotov said the following:

"We already have the basic calculations for it. They show that in 1935 the State will have a grain reserve exceeding this year's reserve by approximately 120,000,000 poods. We are unquestionably supplied with sufficient grain, in particular for the entire period of 1935 up to the new crop."

It will not be out of place to state that the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. has borne in mind the important part played by combines in the speeding up of the harvesting of grain and, associated with this, of the decline in losses during the process of the harvesting, and has now decided that industry must ensure that next year the number of combines in use be increased by one and one-half times. This year there were 33,000 combines. Next year, by the beginning of the harvesting, 47,000 should be in use, while by August there should be 50,000 combines at work.

* * *

Thus, the Soviet government has gone from victory to victory and prepared all the necessary conditions for the abolition of the card (ration) system in respect to bread and a number of other products.

How will the transfer from the card system to developed Soviet trading in bread be rendered easier?

At the present time there are 50,000,000 people (workers, office employees, etc., students and people in receipt of pensions, including their families) supplied from centralized and local supplies with bread at low "ration" prices which are completely independent of market prices. Besides this, in regions where technical cultures are produced, about 24,000,000 peasants are supplied with bread from State resources, in return for raw materials supplied to the State. This, of course, is a tremendous burden on the State, one which will cease to exist with the abolition of the card system. Quite large economies will also be made by the State by doing away with the big apparatus which was set up to operate the rationing of supplies for the town population, an apparatus which costs over 300,000,000 rubles per annum.

It would, however, be fundamentally untrue to conclude that the Soviet government is preparing to "earn something" out of the abolition of the card system, that it will receive "profits" out of it. The Soviet government sets itself not only the mighty aim of Communism, but also at every step in the direction of this aim, displays the greatest care for the material interests of the workers and toiling peasantry today. It is for that that it is the dictatorship of the proletariat. It is for that that it is a government in a workers' and peasants' State. In accordance with this, when the Soviet government decided to abolish the card (ration) system which created a certain privileged position for wide sections of toilers, it at the same time decided to undertake a series of measures to compensate them for this, and this will make very big demands on the State.

We have already stated that by way of compensation the wages fund is to be increased by 4,200,-

* One hactare equals 2½ acres.

000,000 rubles, that the prices for agricultural raw materials delivered to the State are to be increased by thousands of millions of rubles, that the prices on all compulsory grain deliveries to the State are to be increased by 10 per cent, and that all purchases of surplus grain in the hands of the collective farmers, etc., made by the State and cooperative organizations are to be increased by 20 per cent, and that at the same time there is to be an increase in expenditure in connection with the extension of the network of trading stores.

But, what is more, in a capitalist State an increase in wages and an increase in the prices of raw materials would inevitably and automatically lead to an increase in the prices of industrial products. Anarchy, however, does not reign in Soviet economy. What we have is planned organization, and the Soviet government has decided not to allow such consequences. It has decided to prevent an increase in the price of industrial products at the expense of those surpluses of State income which will be available as a result of the abolition of the card (ration) system. In his report, Comrade Molotov said the following in this connection:

> "The raising of prices for agricultural raw materials will, of course, call forth great additional expenditure by the government. Here it is a matter of several billion rubles of additional expenditure by the government. In connection with the raising of selling prices of bread, however, these expenses must be compensated and must not affect commodity prices of industrial products.
>
> "From what has been said above on the raising of wages and on the raising of prices of agricultural raw materials for industry, it would seem that along with additional profits the State will have greater additional expenses. Our task is to carry out the present decision in such a way that the expenses should not exceed the income."

In addition to the financial measures referred to, which the Soviet government is adopting so as to compensate those categories of workers and employees who might suffer loss *today, during the interval of the transition* from the abolition of the card system, the members of the C.P.S.U. are now being roused so as to discover additional resources which will make it easier for the workers during the transition from the card system to the purchase of bread on the open Soviet market.

In his splendid report to the Moscow Party organization about the decisions of the November Plenum of the C.C., Comrade Kaganovitch paid exceptional attention to the question of ensuring that the workers are well fed in the period of the transition from the card system to developed free trade in bread, and, placing this question with the concreteness which is usual of him, he dealt separately with the special features of the conditions of each category, of each section of workers.

He particularly directed the attention of the Party functionaries to the fact that it will be essential, when the card system is abolished, to render every possible assistance to workers who have large families. The statistical data which he quoted show that a considerable majority of the workers employed in the factories of Moscow have no dependents, while the percentage of workers who have large families is a comparatively small one, but it is precisely these workers who have large families who are likely to feel very much the effects of the abolition of the card system in the first period. And so Comrade Kaganovitch proposed a whole series of concrete measures which will render aid to these workers. Ror instance, he proposed that they be supplied with potatoes instead of cereal (the prices of which latter are now to be very much increased as a result of the fact that they have hitherto been distributed, on production of the ration cards, at very low prices, and as a result of the bad harvest of buckwheat, while the harvest of potatoes has been a good one). He suggested an improvement in the conditions of communal dining as far as these categories of workers are concerned, an improvement in conditions as far as their children are concerned, and measures to give these workers higher qualifications, etc.

* * *

The Mensheviks began to dance around the question of real wages, in connection with the abolition of the rationing of bread supplies, before the publication of the decisions of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. No sooner did Comrade Kalinin declare at a plenary meeting of the Moscow Soviet that there was a proposal to abolish the card system in connection with bread, then the Menshevik, Mr. A. Jugov, wrote the following in this connection in an article entitled "Our Daily Bread", and published in No. 22 of the *Sozialisticheske Vestnik* (The Socialist News, a paper published by the Mensheviks in Paris—*Ed.*):

> "The abandonment of the rationing of supplies, *i.e.*, the transfer of the toilers from the necessity of purchasing even bread at prices three to five times higher than 'rationed' prices, once again raises the question in all its sharpness of the complete failure of existing average wages to correspond to the new minimum standard of existence. The transfer to 'commercial' supplies in the Soviet Union implies a reduction of real wages by from 3 to 5 times, with real wages preserved at their present level."

Only a bookkeeper accustomed to rubbing out his accounts can make crooked calculations of this char-

acter. Let us even presume that Mr. Jugov did not foresee that when the Soviet government does away with the card system for bread it will reduce "commercial" prices for bread and will sell it at a price which is the average between the hitherto "commercial" price and the "ration" price. Let us also presume that Mr. Jugov did not understand that the abolition of the card system and the wide development of Soviet trade must inevitably lead to a *further* reduction in the "commercial" and market prices for bread and all other commodities.

Even in such a case he should have known (something which even the correspondents of the bourgeois papers, the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Neue Freie Presse* are aware of and speak about) that the prices of "rationed" bread and the prices paid for bread sold in the "commercial" stores have come very close to one another during the last year, that the "commercial" price for bread is now by no means three to five times higher than the price of "rationed" bread, that the price of "rationed" rye bread (black bread) is 50 kopeks now, while the "commercial" price is 1 ruble 50 kopeks, and that the price of "rationed" wheat (brown) bread is now 1 ruble 20 kopeks, while the "commercial" price is 3 rubles.

Further, let us even presume that Mr. Jugov did not foresee that the Soviet government would give compensation for the temporary rise in the price of bread by comparison with the "rationed" price, by allotting an additional 4,200,000,000 rubles to the wages fund. In such a case also Mr. Jugov should have known that large sections of workers are now already extending their purchases in the "commercial" stores, and do not limit themselves to their "ration", that expenditures made on the purchase of bread comprise only a portion of the worker's budget, and that the Soviet worker only *eats* bread (and not only bread), but does not dress himself in it, does not sleep on it, and does not wash himself with it. What then becomes of Mr. Jugov's bookkeeping to the effect that the increase in the price of bread by three to five times is allegedly bound to result in a similar reduction in real wages by three to five times? This is a clear sample of Menshevik information about the U.S.S.R.

The Soviet government and the C.P.S.U. are doing everything possible to make it easier for the proletariat to pass from the card (ration) system of purchasing bread, to the free purchase of bread on the Soviet market, while, as Comrade Molotov noted in his report, the abolition of the card system for the receipt of bread "will provide the beginning for the abolition of the card system in respect to the purchase of *all* products and commodities". What will the abolition of the card system give the workers and peasants, in other words, what aims does the Soviet government set itself when abolishing the card system?

1. Under the card (ration) system, bread supplies are mechanically distributed and the consumer is regarded as an *abstract human being*, as an "average weight consumer". Neither the individual regiments of the consumer nor his individual tastes are considered, nor are the special features of the various districts taken into account, in line with the proverb which says that "you must not look a gift horse in the mouth". The replacement of the card system by Soviet trade will raise the respect of the salesman for the consumer, and the assortment of goods offered for sale will be more varied. There will be an improvement in the delivery of baked bread to the private addresses of purchasers. Every worker and his family will be guaranteed the possibility of purchasing bread in stores most convenient to himself and when he wants, of purchasing bread of the *quality* he himself prefers.

2. The town population were supplied with their ration of bread at low prices, which had no relation whatsoever to the price on the market. The peasants reacted to this by very much inflating prices on the local market. The abolition of the card system will meet the wishes of the whole of the toiling peasantry and will serve to intensify the goods turnover between town and village and *to consolidate further the "smychka" (alliance) between the proletariat and the toiling peasantry.*

3. The abolition of the card system will serve *to strengthen further the Soviet ruble* and to raise its exchange rate. While the card system was in being, and there were two or three prices for bread ("ration" prices, State "commercial" prices, and prices on the local market), speculation in bread was inevitable. As long as the card system existed a large number of people who received their rations used their bread tickets to purchase more bread than they actually consumed, and immediately and on the spot sold the surplus bread they had at higher prices, or else exchanged this surplus bread for milk or other agricultural products.

The abolition of the card system will undermine speculation in bread. At the same time the establishment of *uniform State prices* for each of the eight regions into which the Soviet Union is to be divided *will raise the importance of the Soviet ruble*, in its function as means of circulation, as means of goods turnover, in its function as an accounting unit, and in its function as the money form of wages. This will make it possible to intensify the circulation of products, to utilize wages better by making distinctions in their allocation, so as to raise the productivity of labor, and will make it possible to introduce more correctly business accounting and to plan economy more correctly.

4. The abolition of the card system will provide the *Soviet policy of reducing prices on all products with a real and firm basis,* for it must be borne firmly in mind that the abolition of the card system in the U.S.S.R. will lead, not to the establishment of *bourgeois* free trade, but to the wide development of *Soviet* trade, *i.e.,* trade without capitalists and without speculators, and, what is more, trade which the Soviet government, the main holder of grain supplies, and *precisely because it is a working class government which defends the interests of the workers,* will regulate in such a way that the prices of bread will gradually fall. And since bread is the *foremost* product in the Soviet Union, a reduction in the price of bread will bring about a reduction in the prices of all other commodities.

That this is possible and that this will be so without fail has already been confirmed by the experience of the development of "commercial" trading in the State "commercial" shops in the Soviet Union during the years 1933 and 1934. In spite of the fact that the stormy growth of State "commercial" trading in bread took place in this period parallel with practically a similar growth of collective farm trading, State "commercial" trading had a very powerful influence on the prices of bread ruling in the local markets, which were reduced and which have steadily approached the State "commercial" prices.

As long as there was no "commercial" trade in bread, the difference between the prices operating in the local markets and the extremely low fixed prices for the bread received with the "ration cards" was so great that the State could not possibly influence the prices ruling in the local markets; but as soon as the State started the sale of bread in "open shops" at "commercial" prices the situation immediately altered. Data gathered by the People's Commissar for Internal Trade, Comrade Weitser, show that the local market prices for bread and flour in the biggest centers of the Soviet Union fell by from two to three times in the course of one year. The local market prices for rye (black) bread fell in the period between July 1933 and July 1934 by 48 per cent in Moscow, 43 per cent in Gorky, 75 per cent in Stalingrad, 53.6 per cent in Stalinsk, and 33 per cent in Berezniki, etc. During the same period prices for brown bread fell by 39 per cent in Moscow, 61.6 per cent in Gorky and 68 per cent in Saratov. The prices for rye flour fell by 51 per cent in Moscow, 67.4 per cent in Gorky, 82.5 per cent in Dniepropetrovsk, and 66.7 per cent in Novosibersk, etc.

There can be no doubt whatsoever that after *uniform* State prices are established in connection with the abolition of the card system, internal State trade in bread will become a factor of still more decisive importance, and its influence in bringing prices down on the local markets will become still greater.

5. The reduction in the market price for grain will furnish a new stimulus for the development of cattle breeding.

To sum up, the abolition of the card system and the wide development of Soviet trade will lead to *a further marked improvement in the material conditions of the working class and of all the toilers.*

* * *

The reorganization of the Political Departments and their transformation into ordinary Party bodies serve a similar purpose, namely, the improvement of the conditions of the toiling peasantry.

The resolution of the November Plenum quite correctly points out that the comrades working in the Political Departments "have in the majority of cases shown themselves in their very best light, as real Bolshevik Party organizers". This is best of all proven by the tremendous organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms, achieved with the aid of the Political Departments over the last two years, and which has found expression in the better cultivation of the collective farm fields, in the better gathering of the harvest and in the far speedier fulfillment by the collective farms of grain deliveries to the State.

This tremendous organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms in the course of these two years which have passed since Comrade Stalin made his famous speech at the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. in January 1933, when he uttered a warning regarding the defects in the work in the village, has only been possible for the following reasons:

It has been possible because the Party transferred to the Political Departments of the Machine Tractor Stations 17,000 well-tested and politically skilled Party workers; because the Party with the aid of the Political Departments, exposed and in the main drove the anti-Soviet wrecking elements, kulaks, and their hirelings out of the collective farms, and because the active workers in the collective farms were rallied together, aided by the Political Departments, while socialist competition and shock work were developed in the villages.

Why, then, is there to be a reorganization of the Political Departments attached to the Machine Tractor Stations? (In the State farms and on the railroads where the urgent tasks facing the Political Departments have not yet been fulfilled in a sufficient degree, they continue to be preserved in their previous form.)

The correspondent of the Polish Telegraphic Agency has made the lying assertion that the subordination of the Political Departments to the Dis-

trict Committees of the Party bears witness to the "dissatisfaction of the central authorities with the personnel of the Political Departments who have repeatedly taken up a stand alongside the peasants". The lying character of this fantasy may be seen, if only from the following fact, namely, in the Resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. it states in black and white that:

> *"Considering that all the comrades now working in the Political Departments must be unconditionally retained for work in the districts, we consider it necessary that they be utilized in the future."*

The Political Departments of the Machine Tractor Stations are now being reorganized into ordinary Party bodies, and are being merged with the existing District Committees of the Party because the Political Departments were an *exceptional* form of Party organization faced with especially *urgent* tasks. These urgent tasks have now in the main been fulfilled, and the District Committees have themselves also been consolidated under the influence of the Political Departments. Now the task is no longer merely to strive for the fulfillment of the sowing plan and of the plans covering harvesting and grain deliveries. What is now needed is that *all* sides of life in the village be more widely covered, and the Political Departments are not adequate to achieve this. To ensure that leadership will be given to all the activity going on in the collective farm village, namely, political, economic, cultural and living conditions (the construction of schools, hospitals, cinemas, clubs, roads, etc.), what is required is that the ordinary Party and Soviet bodies which have absorbed the comrades working in the Political Departments and which cover the whole of this activity, be strengthened. This activity covers administrative, economic, cultural and living conditions, financial work, etc.

Along with the decision to absorb the Political Departments in the District Committee of the Party, the November Plenum of the C.C. adopted a resolution to strengthen *collective farm democracy,* to ensure that the chairmen of collective farms are elected, and that the positions of the latter are rendered stable, and decided to make corresponding alterations in the statutes of the collective farms hitherto in use, and which have now become out of date. The November Plenum also passed a resolution to strengthen *the operation of the law* in the collective farm village—in particular, to forbid any kind of administrative encroachments on the funds of the collective farm, without the corresponding decision of the courts.

The decisions of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. represent a new mighty victory achieved by the C.P.S.U. and the Soviet government on the road to the transformation, under the leadership of the proletariat, of a country which was recently backward, into a socialist country, a country cultured, and well-to-do, and having the most advanced industry.

This victory by no means implies that the tasks facing the C.P.S.U. have now become lighter and simpler. On the contrary, the tasks facing the Party in connection with the November decisions of the Central Committee will become still more complicated and still more varied. The Party will have to assist in bringing about a new inflow of individual peasants into the collective farms (a powerful new flow of individual peasants into the collective farms has already begun in Soviet Ukraine and other regions and republics, following the publication of the decisions made by the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.).

The Party will have to consolidate the collective farms still further. It will have to continue a merciless struggle against the relics of kulakdom.

> "In spite of the tremendous growth and the consolidation of the economic power of the collective farms, in spite of the growth and the activity of the collective farms, there are still many defects in the work of the latter, while the undermining, wrecking activities of kulak elements who have penetrated into the collective farms have not yet finally been smashed in a number of collective farms." (Resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.)

The Party will have to develop tremendous energy if the transfer from the card (ration) system to the broad development of Soviet trade is to be carried through painlessly, and if the mighty aims which the Soviet government has set itself in abolishing the card system, a system necessary at one time but which has now become a hindrance to further development, are to be achieved in the shortest space of time. And we need have no doubt that the Bolsheviks will fulfill these tasks successfully, for they are people who are not accustomed to resting on their laurels.

And it is just at such a time when the might of the Soviet Union is being so tremendously consolidated that the shot fired by a miscreant has been heard. The vile relics of the former Zinoviev anti-Party group, of the former Zinoviev-Trotzkyite anti-Party opposition, deprived one of the best and most beloved leaders of the Party, Comrade Kirov, of his life. In its victorious advance the C.P.S.U. has wiped out its internal class enemies, wiped out all the anti-Party groupings hostile to socialism, the Trotzkyites, the Zinovievites, the Right opportunists, and the deviators on the national question.

The miserable relics of our class enemies, who are

now completely isolated in the land of the Soviets, finding that they are completely helpless in the task of finding support for themselves among the population of the Soviet Union, are now seizing with ever greater wrath on the last weapon of the white guard and the fascist, namely, the weapon of terror.

The tremendous wave of sorrow which seized hold of the population of the Soviet Union when it became known that Comrade Kirov had been assassinated, the wave of sorrow the like of which has not been seen in the land of the Soviets since the death of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and a similar wave of indignation expressed by millions and millions of workers, peasants, and of the Soviet intelligentsia, bear witness to the fact that this base assassination will only increase the *watchfulness* of these millions tenfold in regard to their class enemies.

Not for one moment will the frenzy of our beaten class enemies, who are, however, not yet wiped out, hold up or restrain the Soviet Union, led as it is by the C.P.S.U. and the leader of the world proletariat, the genius, Comrade Stalin, from its triumphant march forward to the classless society, and anyone who dares to stand in the way, and to cast spokes in the wheels of the triumphant Soviet chariot, will be mercilessly crushed, to the mighty approval of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the proletariat throughout the world.

THE UNITED FRONT—NEXT STEPS

By HARRY POLLITT

"The extension of the united front tactics, demonstrated already in the municipal elections and to be carried further with the further development of the situation, needs thorough-going discussion.

"It is clear that the Communist Party has not changed its views of the Labor Party, of its character, of its program or of the policy which the Labor Party leaders would endeavor to carry out in a future Labor Government.

"Since this is so, what is the basis of the new extended united front tactics in the elections? The correct understanding of these questions is the key to our whole line in the coming period. What is our attitude to the Labor slogan of a Third Labor Government? What should be the tactics of the militant workers at the coming General Election?" (Political Bureau Opening Statement on the Coming Thirteenth Party Congress of the C.P.G.B.)

IN the recent municipal elections, the Communist Party made a very important step forward in the development of its campaign for building up the united front against the National Government and employers' attacks and against fascism and war.

It is now necessary, in view of the whole situation confronting the workers, and the results and experiences gained in the municipal elections, to consider what are the next steps to be taken by the Communist Party in the carrying out of its most important task—the building up of the fighting united front of action, to achieve the workers' immediate demands, and prevent the advance of fascism and war.

In this article I shall not review in detail the experiences of the Communist Party in the municipal elections all over the country, but indicate the main features of the elections, and some lessons for the Communist Party.

The election results undoubtedly show the hatred of the workers for the National Government and all capitalist representatives on the local councils, and their firm determination to get rid of them on any occasion presenting itself; a determination which is deeper and more class-conscious than ever before, particularly after the experiences of the fight against fascism in Germany, Austria, and more recently in Spain.

There can be no doubt at all but what the recent events in Spain, occurring as they did on the eve of the municipal elections, also exercised a big influence. The elections also gave added point to a generally accepted conclusion, namely, that the most outstanding feature of the mood of the workers in Britain at the present time is their passionate desire for united action, and it is significant that in those wards where the Labor candidates were supporting the united front, their votes were the highest ever recorded in those particular places.

It is important to note, also, that the aims of the workers as expressed in the elections, and in the various mass campaigns which have taken place in Britain this year, are entirely different from the aims of their leaders. There is nothing in common, in my opinion, between the aims and intentions of the workers still under the influence of the Labor leaders and the policy that these leaders are carrying out. There is a class movement behind the swing to the Labor Party in the elections. It is a mass movement of the workers that cannot be separated from the militant movement, that this year has particularly manifested itself in the support of the Hunger March and National Congress; the big anti-fascist actions; the strikes, and militancy displayed in these strikes, reaching its highest point in the Taff Merthyr strike.

The task of the Communist Party is to organize this class feeling, mood and determination of the workers to fight their class enemies, into a definite united front movement of daily conscious struggle, which can develop so strongly in the factories, trade unions and localities, that it not only breaks down the ban on united front activity imposed by the Labor leaders, but effectively challenges their whole policy of class collaboration.

It is this new feature of the present moods of the workers that has already forced significant concessions to be given by the employers on the wage demands of the workers, and Labor Councils to act more quickly than ever before in fulfilling certain parts of the election pledges.

It also explains the fierce resentment now being expressed in many local Labor Parties at the proposal of Herbert Morrison, to Labor Councils, not to forget to elect Tory Aldermen. For in this proposal the workers see the effort being made to continue capitalist traditions, that cover the carrying out of the whole principle of capitalist continuity.

This proposal of Morrison's also shows his terror of the one-party system of local government which the workers have established in a number of London boroughs, and he is anxious to bring in by the back door the peaceful old two-party system that is so helpful to the Labor leaders' policy of class collaboration.

Our Party adopted a political line in the recent municipal elections that correctly demonstrated revolutionary leadership and understanding of which was the next link in the chain that had to be grasped in order to strengthen the unity in action of the working class.

What was the situation? First, the growing recognition that even the limited forms of united action, achieved in struggle during this year, had clearly revealed the great possibilities and victories that could be gained by the workers if the united front was extended to the elections and not limited in its scope. Combined with this was the demand of the workers that everything possible should be done to strengthen their fighting united action in every phase of the class struggle.

Second, the growing tension in the whole international situation—the events in Spain; the government crisis in France, hiding the attempts of the fascists in France to establish an open fascist regime; in Britain, the Sedition Bill; the new drive for the lowering of the standards of the workers, and the increasing exploitation and impoverishment of the workers.

Third, the great successes of the united front in France before and during the Communal elections, and the increased prestige and influence of the Communist Party of France, leading to the consolidation and strengthening of the united front to such an extent that the fascist line of Doumergue was undoubtedly checked.

Fourth, when the Labor leaders of the Labor Party and Trade Union Congress, after Weymouth and Southport, with their "million majorities" against the united front, felt that they had at last adopted measures which were effectively preventing any further development of united front activity between the workers under their influence and the revolutionary workers, and when they had gone even further and brought forward proposals for adoption in the trade unions and trade councils that could only result in splitting the trade unions and trade councils all over the country.

Fifth, when in the localities it was absolutely clear that although we had got various united front campaigns successfully initiated, when it came to elections, the local Labor Party workers were apprehensive that the same unity in action could not find a means of expressing itself in the electoral struggle as well, and when the argument about splitting the workers' forces came up in a very sharp form.

These were the main factors which demanded an extension in the united front policy of the Communist Party.

What were the main positive gains that resulted from this policy? First, the Communist Party undoubtedly helped forward the development of the militant swing against capitalism and all that it stood for, both in national and local politics; that the Communist Party was brought into closer touch with local Labor Party workers, members and officials, and with workers under the influence of the local Labor Parties than ever before; that we were able to explain our policy and tactics to sections of reformist workers who have previously been hostile to our policy, or completely untouched by our propaganda; that the publicity and discussion created, particularly in the local press all over the country, by the united front proposals of the Communist Party in the elections, and the demands from the rank and file of the Labor Party, that the united front should be established with the Communist Party, represent a big advance.

Our proposals undoubtedly struck a heavy blow at the intentions of the Labor leaders, who had thought that they had smashed the possibility of a further extension of the united front in Britain, but who now see it breaking through in the localities in a sharper form than ever before, and under circumstances which make it increasingly difficult for them to prevent the workers under their influence taking part, and it has established a firm basis for the immediate following up and the carrying on in more practical forms of united front activity in connection with the fulfilment of the election pledges and program of the Labor Party in the municipal elections.

What were the principal weaknesses revealed in the election campaign? The main weakness was the putting forward of unity as an abstract thing and not seeing the united front of action as the only means of defending the interests of the workers.

The tendency to swing right over to the belief that we ought to withdraw all Communist Party candidates and give the Labor Party a clear field; that even where Communist Party candidates were running more attention was given in such places to explaining the united front proposals in general and not enough drive for our own policy and support for our own candidates; insufficient attention was given to carrying out joint activity in the election campaign where the Labor candidates accepted our united front proposals, and we did not press home sufficiently strongly the necessity for our taking part in Labor election meetings, canvassing and all other forms of electoral activity, in order to mobilize every working man and woman behind the united front that had been concluded in such localities.

Insufficient Communist Party meetings were carried on in places where we had established the united front with the Labor Party and Labor candidates, to explain our own election program, as well as why we were supporting the Labor candidates. We did not make clear in our meetings that our criticism of the Labor Party program and policy remains; while at the same time we gave full support to those who agreed with the united front and are prepared to support it in action.

In London, Glasgow, Manchester, and in many other important centers, it was clearly revealed by the election results that insufficient preparations were made for the elections, and, in some cases, candidates put forward where we had no mass basis to justify this, and where the united front with the local Labor Party would have brought much better results to the working-class fight in these localities, and laid a firm basis for future developments.

Finally, the outstanding weakness in the municipal elections was that there was no consistent recruitment for the Communist Party. We have not yet learned that in every campaign in which the Communist Party takes part, the test of it for our Party is not only how strongly we have developed the united front, but also how much stronger we have built the Communist Party, as a result of the continual winning of recruits, because the stronger the Communist Party becomes, the stronger become the revolutionary working-class forces, consciously working in every sphere for the development of united front activity, and for the revolutionary way out of the crisis.

In working for the unity of the working class in its fight to win immediate demands. the Communist Party shows that it alone understands the strategy and tactics of the class struggle. Therefore the successful growth of united front activity depends on the strengthening of the Communist Party's organization and influence.

Those militant workers who are not yet in the ranks of the Communist Party can greatly strengthen the fight for unity by joining the Party, bringing their experience to the service of the only Party whose policy is based entirely on the class struggle, and which for that reason, and because of its international outlook and organization, is the only Party which can lead the workers forward to the overthrow of capitalism and the building of Socialism.

What are the next steps to be taken in the united front campaign? I believe that every unit and local organization of our Party must become really active and concerned in all aspects of local politics and must emerge as the leaders for the workers' demands in connection with such questions as rents, housing, work schemes, Public Assistance Relief, as well as being able to take part in the general political issues and campaigns.

On these questions detailed directives have already been issued to the Party, and it is not necessary here to amplify these; only to emphasize that the united front proposals of our Party in the municipal elections were not put forward only for the duration of the election campaign, but were put forward for continued application after the elections, and it will be the degree that this daily application of the line is carried out that alone can build up the basis for a further successful extension of the united front and bring into active participation the broad mass of the workers who are still under the influence of the Labor leaders.

However, it is necessary, as the Opening Discussion Statement of the Political Bureau indicated, that we should consider what extension of our united front policy is demanded in the present situation. We should not be afraid to face the position boldly, overcome any difficulties and obstacles which we may meet, in our efforts to win the broadest masses of the workers to support the policy of the Communist Party.

A warning note needs to be sounded, that the whole success of the united front as a fighting front of working-class action depends upon what is done now to build it up in the daily struggle. We say this to guard against the danger of believing that an extension of our policy of achieving unity in action in the elections is only something to be practiced and fought for at election times.

Nothing could be more dangerous; the whole success of united activity depends upon what is done now in the factories, trade unions, and localities, to achieve the maximum unity in action, to secure the demands of the employed and unemployed workers, and the more this is done, the greater will be the

class character of any gains over our enemies in the elections.

Therefore, while steadfastly pursuing every present effort to build up the united front, I believe our Party Congress should clearly work out the policy to be adopted in all coming urban and Parliamentary elections, up to the General Election, and that the policy decided upon should immediately be popularized and operated in every case where it is applicable. With specific reference to the General Election, I believe that although we have previously announced our intention to enter candidates in a considerable number of constituencies, we must now consider this decision carefully, and our policy should be as follows:

1. We run Communist candidates only where we really have a mass basis and in these places make every conceivable effort to secure the election of the Communist candidates.

2. That we shall put forward a series of immediate demands which every worker believes it is absolutely essential to secure. Such demands may be as follows:

Abolition of the Means Test.

Repeal of the Trade Union Act.

Seven-hour day, without wage-cuts for the miners.

Forty-hour week without wage-cuts.

Repeal of the Unemployment Act, and the abolition of the labor and concentration camps.

Repeal of the Sedition Bill.

3. Declaration in favor of the united front against fascism and war, embracing every section of the working-class movement.

The Party should start work immediately in every area, popularizing these demands. In particular, we should put them before every Labor Party and Labor candidate, and make every effort to get them to pledge support for these demands, and for a united front campaign to win them.

I believe we can secure scores of Labor Parties and candidates to support this policy, so that immediately the situation in such localities takes on an entirely different character—a character of united mass struggle to win vital immediate demands of the working class.

In such a situation, the workers can understand that the demands do not depend only on speeches and votes in Parliament; the demands become the platform of action, organizing bigger sections of workers in united activity than ever before.

But it is absolutely imperative that the Communist Party shall also secure victory for its candidates, and secure revolutionary representation in Parliament. The whole resources of the Party must be organized behind the Communist candidates in the constituencies for which they are selected. It must be clearly understood that a group of Communists in Parliament will have the greatest importance for the whole working class, as well as leading to significant changes in the attitude taken up in Parliament by other representatives of the working class.

The winning of the workers for the support of Communist Party candidates is in no sense a weakening of the united front; on the contrary, the more workers we win for the program of the Communist Party, which is the revolutionary solution of the crisis, the stronger becomes the work for the united front to achieve certain immediate demands, because more conscious revolutionary fighters have been won for the Communist Party, who are able to relate the daily struggle of the working class to their final revolutionary aim—the conquest of power, the establishment of the Workers' Dictatorship, and the building of the new socialist society.

If, therefore, we carry out this policy, as well as giving full support to those Labor Parties and candidates who are prepared to participate in a common fight on such issues as we have indicated, and in the united front fight against fascism and war, we are taking steps that can change entirely the political perspectives before the working class by the sharpening of the class issues that will take place, the destruction of many illusions regarding the attitude of the capitalist class and the program and policy of the Labor Party, and a powerful development in all forms of class action and struggle.

It is also essential to realize that this policy and the results it can bring depend on popularizing the program and policy of the Communist Party not only where we are running candidates, but in every place where there is a cell and local organization of the Party, we must popularize not only our united front policy, but the whole revolutionary program of the Communist Party.

This will not only lead to the consistent daily recruiting and building up of the Party, but, in the event of betrayals taking place of the workers' interests by their leaders, any disillusionment thus created will not find an outlet by turning to the National Government as in 1931, or to the open Fascist Party of Mosley, but it will come to the Communist Party, whose ranks will be strengthened by the addition of large numbers of newly awakened class-conscious workers.

The Labor leaders will bitterly oppose this policy. They will issue the instruction, "No united front agreement with the Communist Party". They will do this, not because they are afraid in the coming General Election that they will be tainted with Moscow, not because they are afraid that the Labor Party will be identified in what is called the "public mind" with Communism, not because they are afraid that this identification would lead to the loss of votes.

They will oppose this line, because they believe it will win mass support on the basis of the united

front demands, that is to say, for class struggles, for going forward against the capitalist enemy, in every phase of the daily struggle, developing such power and organization, as to sharpen the whole class issue between the working class and capitalist class.

Therefore, if our Party Congress adopts this line, and makes it the dominating note in all its subsequent work, if it is carried through in the ranks of our Party, and with the authority of the Party Congress behind it and the election of the C.C. on the basis of the Congress decisions, then we shall see our Party making a tremendous step forward in the building up of such a united front as will receive the enthusiastic support and practical backing of decisive sections of workers—a united front based on the support of the workers in the factories, trade unions and Labor Parties, which strengthens the daily fight, and at elections is expressed in votes that are the demand also of action and struggle. Such a policy and such a united front in which scores of local Labor and Communist councillors and Labor and Communist members of Parliament are pledged to fight will be the most formidable challenge yet made, both to the class collaboration policy of the Labor leaders and to the capitalist class. Such a policy will meet with the unconcealed opposition of both the Labor leaders and the capitalist class. Such a policy can lead to the building up of a fighting united front that can bring into daily mass united activity millions of British workers.

But there is another question which must be discussed, this is the Labor Party slogan of "a third Labor government". We must again remember that our Party, because of the present situation, has to give a clear answer as to where it stands in relation to this slogan. It must do so, because it is an indisputable fact that, so far as millions of workers are concerned, they as yet only see as practical politics the alternatives of either a National government or a Labor government. The nearer we approach the general election, the more this question will become the main topic of discussion in factory, street and working class home.

Therefore our Thirteenth Party Congress, meeting in 1935, will not only have to lay down its own program of action, its policy in the trade unions, its policy of the united front, it will have to relate the whole question of the united front also to the answer it gives to the issue that a general election will raise, *i.e.*, National government or Labor government. And we must discuss this question in the light of the situation as it really does exist, because it is always the immediate situation that determines the tactical line of the Communist Party.

In this connection it is important to recall the analysis made a year ago by the Thirteenth Plenum of the E.C. of the Communist International, which states:

> "The tremendous strain of the internal class antagonisms in the capitalist countries, as well as of the international antagonisms, testify to the fact that the objective prerequisites for a revolutionary crisis have matured to such an extent that at the present time the world is closely approaching a new round of revolutions and wars."

Everything which has happened this year only brings out more sharply the accuracy of this analysis, and we must be mindful that in this present period, when "the world is closely approaching a new round of revolutions and wars", Britain is not a country that is isolated from this analysis of the C.I., but is decisively concerned, and in this situation the National government will fight to the death against any attempts to undermine the position of British capitalism or to overthrow its present form of government.

Because of the whole international situation, we must bear in mind the important role that the results of the next general election will play in national and international politics.

It has been demonstrated beyond all doubt in France that where the workers succeeded in overcoming the obstacles to united front action, and together with the revolutionary workers carried out united activity, the advance of fascism and war has been stemmed, and, further, that the most important gains have been registered in the economic struggles as well.

Had it not been for the existence of this united front in France, the political situation in that country today would be entirely different, and would have immediately brought about a change in the international situation: a change that would have had very far-reaching significance for the working class all over the world; a change which would have brought not only war much nearer, but would have represented a considerable strengthening of the fascist elements in every capitalist country, and especially Britain.

But because of the united front between the Communist Party and the Socialist Party in France (which, be it remembered, has aroused the anger and wrath of the leaders of the British Labor Party) an open fascist government has been so far prevented in France, and in the present international situation this represents a very important gain which cannot be overlooked.

If, after the temporary triumph of fascism in Germany, Austria, and Spain, the political developments which took place in France which gave an early perspective of a completely fascist dictatorship had not been checked, this would have meant war in Europe and intervention against the Soviet

Union, and the strengthening of fascism in Britain.

I put the question in this way because it is necessary to bear in mind, in considering our policy in relation to the situation here in the present period, that any weakening of the forces of capitalism, through securing the immediate demands of the workers through the united front and through the fight against the class collaboration of the Labor leaders, and the policy of the representatives of capitalism in the local and county councils and in Parliament itself, is of tremendous importance, and anything of this description which is achieved here in Britain has now a tremendous effect abroad.

Therefore, in the present period, working class activity against capitalism (even if the reformist illusions are still strong, as they are) takes on an entirely different character than in the past, and if the Communist Party carries on its fight for the united front, and its revolutionary propaganda, it can even objectively become of a revolutionary character.

With these facts in mind, we can approach the question of what lead we are going to give the workers at the general election. It is not a question of our taking over the Labor Party slogan of a third Labor government. Such a slogan immediately implies a government which would continue the line and policy of two previous Labor governments, and would be a disaster for the working class.

The Communist Party openly declares to the working class that a Labor government based upon the program and policy of the Labor Party is a government that will carry forward the whole administration of capitalism, through all its existing State machinery of government and repression, and cannot on this basis be the instrument through which the workers can win power and end the rule of employers, bankers, and landlords. It is also the reason why the specious promises of "the next Labor government will be different from the others" is a cruel deception of the workers, because nowhere in the policy and program of the Labor Party, in its methods of leadership and organization, is there any recognition of the class struggle and the need for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.

The only way in which the working class can find a solution of all the problems with which it is confronted is by the revolutionary way out of the crisis, building up the united front, building up the mass Communist Party, carrying through the workers' revolution, establishing the dictatorship of the working class and the Soviets and commencing to build socialist construction.

This is the fundamental basic program of the Communist Party, and all we do must be directed towards winning mass support for it. In the coming general election, however, the only issue in the minds of these millions of workers is for the continuation of the National government or for a Labor government.

Have we to give a clear lead to these workers in this situation? Have we, in what might well be a decisive general election, determining the political and economic developments for a considerable period to come in Great Britain, to close our eyes to the fact that this is the issue agitating the minds of millions of workers, and give no clear answer? Or give an answer which in the minds of the British working class is no practical answer at all?

I believe that we have to face up frankly to this position, and to consider it in the actual circumstances that exist. What is meant by this? I mean that the situation is now changed to such an extent that while our criticism of the program of the Labor Party not only remains, but must be strengthened, while our criticism of the line of the Labor leaders not only remains, but must be strengthened, we must develop a positive political line towards this question of a Labor government.

We are no longer in 1923-4 when a period of capitalist stabilization was opening out, and it was possible for the first Labor government to come to power. We are no longer in the period of 1929, when the cries of "organized capitalism", "no more capitalist crisis", were the slogans of the day and a second Labor government came to power. We are in 1934. Fascism is in power in Germany, Austria and Spain. The forces of fascism, either through the open fascists as represented by Mosley, or through the policy of governments, as the National government, are ceaselessly carrying out their policy of attacks on the workers. There is mass unemployment. Every worker feels in his bones the menace of fascism and war, and every worker feels the need for the united front, in order to smash the designs of their class enemies. This is the situation today.

There is also another aspect of the situation to which attention must be given. Have we no perspective of the development of the revolutionary struggle in Germany and Austria?

Is it not a fact that the most important developments are taking place in both countries in which in the coming period the working class might very well achieve the most decisive break through and in doing so give an entirely new turn to the international situation? Have we no perspective for Spain? Is it not a fact that, in spite of the bloody terror of the Spanish fascists, every day the most significant happenings are taking place in Spain?

Is it not a fact that any break through now in any of the countries held down by fascist dictatorships, any victory for the revolution, will have a tremendous significance for the British workers, and would face

them with the carrying out of revolutionary tasks? In such a situation, when the masses are in a mood, not for class collaboration with their enemies, but for fighting against them, it will, providing that the Communist Party really carries into practice its united front policy, accompanied by the most intensive popularization of its revolutionary program, become increasingly difficult for the Labor leaders to hold these workers back from securing their demands, and from supporting the workers of Germany, Austria, Spain, or wherever the fight for working class power is being carried on.

I believe that it is worth while repeating a point which I made at the commencement of this article, namely, that the aims and intentions of the workers as expressed in all recent events are in violent contrast to the aims and intentions of their leaders.

In the coming period important issues are at stake, that can have very decisive effects in determining the future line of working class advance against the attacks of capitalism, and in retarding the advance of fascism and war.

It is of the utmost importance to secure a united class front at the general election, which will sweep away the National government and return a Labor government, even though our exposure of the character of a Labor government still stands, because the resultant mobilization and victorious impetus of the united working class will lead to a powerful strengthening of the fighting spirit and class solidarity of the workers, the pressing forward of further demands and advancing struggle, the strengthening of the class line, not the line of class collaboration preached by the Labor Party leadership, and the greater readiness to stand by the workers of other countries and prevent intervention in the event of a revolutionary break through. This becomes the basis for further united front advance and for the advancing leadership of the Communist Party.

The National government, at the coming general election, will resort to every means in their power to continue in power—Red letters, the Communist menace, Post Office savings scares; these will be very small beer to what they will attempt to put across.

The situation may also change to such an extent that the most serious efforts will be made to get a National government established in which the Labor Party will be asked to take part. But every serious observer of what is going on in the working class movement knows that the moods of the workers, especially after the German, Austrian, and Spanish events, are of such a character that short shrift would be made of those who attempted this. We need, today, to see not so much the Hendersons, Morrisons, Citrines, but the workers behind them that can be won and organized for militant working class action.

It may be that international developments may take place postponing the general election — war, deepening of the economic crisis—but these are not arguments against my proposals, they are arguments for them.

The stronger the united front, on the basis of the policy I have outlined, the more difficult it will be for national government stunt propaganda at the last minute to sway the electors; it will only rouse more anger against them. The stronger the united front, the more impossible it will be for the Labor Party leaders to take the Labor Party into a national coalition government.

The stronger the united front, the more powerful will grow the Communist Party in its leadership of the workers' daily struggles, and the stronger will the whole working class be not only to face their daily struggles, but the issues that any crisis may bring along.

The stronger the united front, the more certain it will be that the workers will defeat the National government and the workers will win the majority in the elections, securing the return of a Labor government with a resulting situation which will give a further impetus to the united working class struggle against capitalism, fascism, and war.

The fullest discussion should take place on the issues raised in this article, because we stand at a decisive moment in the future development of the working class fight in Britain and of the Communist Party.

The correct policy and lead now will see our Party come in closer touch than ever before with millions of workers, exercising its influence and leadership and growing into a mass Communist Party.

It is necessary to understand once and for all that the Communist Party of Great Britain is not a propagandist sect; we are a political party, we are a political force. We do not exist only for the propagation of our ultimate aims and policy. We exist to give daily leadership in the changing situation in which we find ourselves.

We are a Party which must give that leadership, which day in and day out can strengthen the workers' fight. Our Party, in pursuing such a line as above, is in no way sinking its independence. On the contrary, it is revealed to the masses as a Party which understands that changes take place which necessitate a change in the whole direction of the working class fight so as to strengthen it in a positive political direction, and when we adopt this line we shall bring an entirely new perspective into the working class movement.

We shall reach out to sections of the working class with whom it is absolutely necessary to get into contact, and establish closest relations with the least possible delay, in order that the united front

can be built up, without which it is childish to consider the question of carrying through a revolution in this country.

I am of the firm opinion that the carrying out of this line will lead to such a strengthening of the united front of the working class, on the basis of the class struggle and of the Communist Party, as will be able to repel the offensive of capital and fascism and to accelerate to an extraordinary degree the inevitable end of capitalist exploitation.

THE 1935 CONFERENCE AND THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE

THE BACKGROUND

THE preliminary negotiations for the calling of a new conference on naval armaments in 1935 in London, deserve exceptional attention. The positions of the chief imperialist powers, which have become clear in the course of these negotiations, plainly reflect the fundamental line of their strategy and the preparations for the forthcoming armed conflicts. The various technical questions touching on naval armaments (such as the problem of the maximum tonnage for ships of various classes, the question of establishing various limits for tonnage and proportions which will express the relationship of forces of the various navies) arise on the basis of the clash of the political and military interests of the imperialist powers, and are merely a reflection of imperialist contradictions in the sphere of fighting technique.

In the Pacific basin are concentrated the most important present-day contradictions.

The unstable equilibrium established in the Pacific as the result of the Washington Agreement in 1921-22, has at the present time been completely upset. The Washington Agreement signified a certain compromise between the imperialist powers on the Pacific insofar as they concerned their political and economic interests in China. As we know, this compromise took on the form of the Nine-Power Treaty, which established the principle of the "Open Door" and equal opportunity for China, and required the powers participating in it to refrain in the future from forming new spheres of exclusive influence in various parts of the country. To this we should add the basic political agreement signed at Washington, the Four-Power Pact, according to which the British Empire, the U.S.A., Japan, and France, mutually guaranteed the inviolability of each others' island possessions in the Pacific Ocean.

On the political basis created by these agreements, the Washington Naval Agreement was drawn up, establishing definite relations between the naval forces of the British Empire, U.S.A., Japan, France, and Italy. This was expressed in the categories of the biggest vessels (battleships and airplane carriers), and required the powers participating in it to refrain from building naval bases and fortifications in certain zones of the Pacific Ocean. In 1930, the Washington Agreement was "rounded off" by the signing of the London Naval Treaty, which established definite quotas for the lighter-armed forces of the British Empire, U.S.A., and Japan.

But the headlong attack of Japanese imperialism beginning in 1931, its attack on China, made a sharp change in the situation in the relationship of forces in the Pacific. The extremely swift seizure of Manchuria, which was converted by the Japanese occupational troops into the "independent State of Manchukuo", the seizure of neighboring regions of Inner Mongolia, repeated invasions of inner China, which signified that in addition to her Manchurian and Mongolian provinces wide districts of the country were under Japanese military control, show that the position of Japanese imperialism has become tremendously stronger on the continent of Asia.

In trying to "round off" and consolidate its gains, the leaders of the militant policy of Japan are preparing for further seizures at the expense of China and are also seeking to make an armed attack on the Soviet Far East. As a consequence of this, Japan, which for three years has in actual fact been carrying on a "minor war" in China, is feverishly increasing its armaments on land, sea and air, and feverishly preparing for a new "big war" on the continent of Asia. At the same time, it is striving to strengthen its naval rear in the Pacific.

A consequence of this is the headlong increase in Japanese naval armaments, which already surpass the actual limits laid down at Washington and London, the open claims of Japan for the repeal of the whole system of international limitations of naval forces and for the equalization of the Japanese navy with those of the British Empire and the U.S.A.

Finally, Japan, scorning the decisions of the Washington agreement and the Statutes of the League of Nations, is fortifying various islands in the Pacific Ocean, including those given to it as "mandates" by the League of Nations. The present line of Japanese policy or, to be more accurate, of Japanese strategy on the Pacific Ocean, is synonymous with the breakdown of the whole system of international obliga-

tions established by the Washington Agreement. As the chief of these agreements—the Nine-Power Pact—has in actual practice been torn to bits by Japanese bayonets, so the other Washington Agreements, in essence, forming the political basis of this Pact, are losing their entire significance. As a result of this, from the point of view of imperialist policy, the forthcoming denunciation of the Washington Agreement by Japan is perfectly logical.

Japan's claim to "parity" for its navy with the British and American navies is in essence a legal formula for ensuring the undivided rule of the Japanese navy in the western part of the Pacific basin. Such domination in turn is looked upon by the political leaders of Japanese imperialism as a necessary means for providing for further annexations at the expense of China, and providing for further preparations for an attack on the Soviet Union.

In view of the immensity of the system of Japanese naval bases in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, and their almost complete absence as far as the U.S.A.—the chief imperialist rival of Japan in the Far East—is concerned, these claims to parity cannot be justified by any "defensive" reasons. Japan is the only one of the big powers whose entire navy and military forces are concentrated in the Far East. None of the possible enemies of Japan could concentrate all its means and forces of war in the Pacific Ocean.

In view of Japanese aggression in China, which touches the interests of Great Britain and America, Japan, in seeking to obtain parity, is trying to insure itself for the future, even if Great Britain and America were to form a united front despite the contradictions separating them at the present time. But at the present moment Japan is not faced with the danger of a united "Anglo-Saxon" front. On the contrary, the contradictions between the British Empire and the U.S.A. in the struggle for world hegemony are still the basic contradictions in the imperialist camp. These contradictions are connected with the struggle for Latin America, for the dominating position in the dominions of the British Empire itself, and with the struggle between London and Washington as to which is to become the money center of the world. It is further connected with the division of the world sources of raw material (oil, rubber, non-ferrous metals, etc.), with the problem of inter-allied war debts and with many other extremely big international economic and political problems.

In the Far East, particularly in China, the policy of the "Open Door" at the present historic stage, while corresponding to the interests of American imperialism, conflicts with the policy of "spheres of influence" conducted by the British Empire, Japan and other imperialist powers. World Anglo-American rivalry leads to rivalry between the big imperialist powers in the sphere of naval armaments, in their struggle for naval domination. This struggle between England and America is complicated at the present time by the actions of the third "partner" as personified by Japanese imperialism.

Japanese diplomacy and the Japanese military clique, who actually direct the policy of the country, are trying to make the fullest use of the Anglo-American contradictions. They are striving to neutralize Great Britain and to draw all the possible advantages from the present military weakness of America in the Far East, thereby stopping America's interference with the Japanese attack on China. Japanese imperialism is striving to an equal degree to utilize another series of international contradictions, especially the contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. In particular, while preparing for an armed attack on our country, Japan is reckoning on support in one form or another from Great Britain. It reckons on the traditional hostility of the leading circles of British imperialism towards the Soviet Union.

The fundamental line of the most influential groups of the British Conservative Party, of British diplomacy and of the leading naval circles in Great Britain, is in essence to try to direct Japanese aggression in a direction which is least dangerous and most desirable for British imperialism. Through the press these circles unambiguously give Japan to understand that they do not intend to contest Japanese domination in Manchukuo and have not the slightest intention of interfering with Japanese expansion to the "north," *i.e.*, against the Soviet Union, the country most hated by the British die-hards.

On the other hand, they warn their Japanese "friends" against further invasions of inner China, especially its central and southern provinces, where the interests of British capital are extremely strongly represented. Simultaneously they are also insuring themselves in case Japanese aggression turns to the south, *i.e.*, in the direction of the colonial possessions and dominions of the British Empire in the Pacific Ocean. In line with this "double insurance" is connected the completion of the construction of the Singapore base, which will make it possible, if necessity should arise, to transfer the main forces of the British navy to the Pacific. With this double policy is also connected the hurried completion of the great airline connecting England with Australia through India.

The center of gravity of British policy is transferred to the strengthening of its armaments. In connection with this, although Great Britain does not encourage the claims of Japan to equality for the Japanese navy with the British and American

navies, it nevertheless does not offer serious resistance to these claims. Simultaneously Great Britain itself is striving to free itself from the restrictions of the London Naval Treaty which applies to light vessels, and in particular puts forward the claim to increase its own cruisers.

With regard to the U.S.A., although this country is interested at the present moment in preserving limited naval quotas and proportions as established in the Washington and London Agreements, it is nevertheless not in a position to avoid the inevitable breakdown and annulment of these treaties. In the present negotiations in London, the U.S.A., deprived of the support of Great Britain, is of necessity compelled to take up a defensive and waiting position in face of the Japanese "offensive". Under such conditions it can only speed up its own war preparations so that in the future it can guarantee for itself the desired relationship of forces, even if there should exist no treaty restrictions.

The rivalry in armaments between the three "ocean" powers is complicated by the imperialist contradictions in Europe. The Franco-Italian naval rivalry for predominating influence in Central Europe, in the Balkans and in the Mediterranean Sea, is sharpening at the present time in spite of the fact that the third partner—German fascism—has come onto the scene and has begun to arm itself at a high speed. The increase in the armaments of the European continental powers inevitably has an effect on the position of Great Britain, and this indirectly sharpens the contradictions between the "ocean" powers.

Such, in the most general terms, is the complicated picture of the struggle taking place on the eve of the forthcoming Naval Conference. This conference is of tremendous importance because it will to a great extent decide the distribution of forces inside the imperialist camp in the next few years, the speed of war preparations and the date of the forthcoming conflicts.

I. ISSUES AND POLICIES

At the present moment the policy of Japan is a most important factor determining the situation on the eve of the new Naval Conference and the outlook for the latter. The claims of Tokyo to achieve "parity" for the Japanese navy on a level with that of the British and American navies for all classes of ships, are the logical result of the basic lines of the foreign policy of Japan and of its preparations for war. In using the latter term, we must have in mind the "big war" which is absolutely unambiguously and openly recommended by the Japanese newspapers and magazines. Innumerable militarist books and pamphlets issued by the thousands under the direct patronage and frequently under the direct guidance of the Japanese military circles continually talk of this "big war".

While warning in advance that it will repudiate the Washington Agreement and the proportions established by it, Japan simultaneously puts forward in the course of the preliminary negotiations its own "positive" program, which it proposes that the future conference should accept as a basis. The exact content of this program has not been published, but on the whole it amounts to the following:

Japan proposes to declare the principle of parity for the principal naval powers and to establish a maximum figure for the total tonnage of the navy, which none of them must exceed. Within the limits of this tonnage, which will be equal for all of them, each of the naval powers must distribute the tonnage of its navy according to its own needs among the various classes of vessels. While abandoning proportions and any more or less exact quantitative restrictions for various classes of ships, Japanese imperialism at the same time advances proposals regarding "qualitative restrictions". This applies first of all to its proposal to abolish airplane carriers. These are the most dangerous type of naval weapon that can be used against Japan, because it is precisely these which reduce the significance of the great areas of the Pacific, which are so favorable for Japan, and it also increases the possibility of using aviation in naval warfare. A proposal is also made for the reduction of the number of battleships and heavy cruisers in the future; in respect to the former, Japan agrees to abolish them altogether. On the contrary, in respect to the light ships (light cruisers, destroyers, submarines) the Japenese program proposes that each power should have the right to build them on the widest scale within the limits of the total tonnage allowed them.

In general, the "reduction" of armaments which the Japanese program has in view would only affect the "strongly armed" powers, in which class the authors of this program modestly do not include Japan itself. Thus this program is calculated on weakening the position of the British and American navies in face of the naval forces of Japan. It deprives America and England of their aeroplane carriers, *i.e.*, it prevents them from using aviation in distant naval theatres of war, reduces the number of their battleships and heavy cruisers and ensures parity for the Japanese navy in respect to the light ships. In other words, this program means the unchallenged domination by the Japanese navy in the western part of the Pacific, *i.e.*, unlimited freedom for Japanese aggression in the countries of the Asiatic continent and a further strengthening of the annexationist policy on the part of Japanese imperialism. Hence the negative attitude taken up by Japan in respect to the

strengthening of the naval bases of other powers in the Pacific.

Japanese imperialism definitely protests against political problems affecting the Pacific Ocean and the Far East being discussed at the forthcoming conference. At the same time the program of naval armaments which it brings forward has undoubtedly as its direct political content the effort to consolidate the annexations which have already been carried out at the expense of China, and to ensure that it will have the possibility of penetrating further into Chinese territory without hindrance, as well as enable it to prepare for war against the U.S.S.R. Under these conditions the repeated proposal of Japan to sign a two-power non-aggression pact with America, or a many-power Pacific pact with the participation of America and Great Britain, may be looked upon as an attempt to convert the Far East, by means of such a treaty, into the exclusive "sphere of influence" of Japan. The real essence of this proposal cannot deceive anybody.

The United States keeps as firmly as Japan to the position which it took up at the very beginning of the London negotiations. It categorically opposes any change whatever in the proportions established between the navies of the powers which participated in the Washington and London Naval Agreements. While thus absolutely rejecting the demand of Japan for "parity" between the chief naval powers, the U.S.A. also rejects the British proposal to reduce the maximum tonnage of the fighting units of various classes, in accordance with the strategic interests of Great Britain.

It is true that recently, in the course of the preliminary London negotiations, the American representatives evidently agreed to make a certain compromise, in the sense of slightly reducing the maximum tonnage of battleships and reducing the maximum calibre of their guns from 16 inches to 14 inches (England proposes to establish a maximum limit of 12 or 11 inches). In respect to cruisers, the Americans stand firmly for a maximum tonnage limit for each unit of this class as established by the Washington Agreement—10,000 tons—and for a corresponding maximum of eight-inch guns. This is explained by the fact that the leaders of American naval strategy, taking into account the few United States naval bases, put their stake mainly on ships with the maximum range of navigation.

Simultaneously the "disarmament" proposals of Japan for the abolition of airplane carriers are absolutely rejected. The leaders of American naval policy correctly look on aviation as their trump card in the struggle against their probable enemies and pay tremendous attention to its further strengthening. It is true that the Americans put forward the proposal, not too insistently it is true, that submarines be abolished. On this question it is possible that there may be certain contact and collaboration between the U.S.A. and Great Britain, in spite of the contradictions which divide them. On the other hand, the question of cruisers continues to be a subject of dispute between the two powers, although it does not come up nowadays as keenly as it did at the three-power conference in Geneva in 1927.

The United States links up the question of naval bases with the question of the relationship of the naval forces of the chief powers. In particular, in official statements, the leaders of American naval policy emphasize that a change in the relationship of naval forces as established by the Washington Agreement will inevitably lead to a change in the decisions of this agreement touching on naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. In other words, the United States will again have the right to fortify the Aleutian Islands, the Philippines and Guam. Though such a statement is more of a demonstrative nature in respect to the Philippines and Guam, since the equipment of a naval base at these points in direct proximity to the possible enemy is extremely difficult and risky under all conditions, nevertheless in respect to the Aleutian Islands such a "reminder" has very real meaning.

The position of Great Britain on the eve of the Naval Conference of 1935 is extremely complicated. This complicated position is a reflection of the position of Britain as the center of the world-wide British Empire and the role of Britain as a European power. In connection with this, Great Britain is influenced both by the factors connected with the naval rivalry between it and the two "ocean" powers—U.S.A. and Japan—and also by the situation in the European seas, especially the Franco-Italian naval rivalry. In the process of the London negotiations, under the pressure of the naval circles and of the most influential groups of the British Conservative Party, the British government put forward demands which amounted to a repudiation of the limitations for the British cruisers as established in London.

Britain again put forward the demand for an "absolute minimum" of 70 cruisers for the British navy, this minimum being represented as necessary for the "defense" of the sea communications of the British Empire. In 1927 this claim, as we know, led to the breakdown of the three-power conference at Geneva. In 1930, at the London conference, British imperialism abandoned this claim for strategic reasons, agreeing to limit its cruisers during the period of the London agreement to a tonnage corresponding roughly to 50 units. We can see how great was the construction carried on even within the limits of the London agreement from the fact that since the conclusion of the treaty in 1930 up to 1934-35 Great Britain built or laid down all-told 17 new cruiser vessels, of which eight were of 7,000 tons, four of

5,200 tons, and five of 9,000 tons, with six-inch guns. Simultaneously, during the same interval of time, 50 destroyers and torpedo boats and 18 submarines of various kinds were built or laid down.

These figures speak eloquently of the extent to which the complaints of the British Conservative press regarding the "weakness" of the British navy and the "fatal results" of the London Treaty for it, were "well founded".

Under the London tonnage limits, Great Britain can still lay down at least eight new cruisers and a considerable number of torpedo boats and submarines in 1935 and 1936. But British imperialism is striving to strengthen its navy still further, primarily in the cruiser class, and hence its claims for 70 units. The English press does everything to conceal the real significance of cruisers and it does that by presenting them before public opinion as "defensive". Their actual role is to carry on offensive operations during a war, to carry out a distant blockade of the enemy, paralyze his overseas trade and make sudden raids on his ports and the less defended points of the coast line. The leaders of American naval policy understand this very well. Taking note of the experience of the World War, when the British blockade was very severely felt by American trade, they are by no means ready to agree to the claims of their rival, which will lead to the further strengthening of its naval power.

The proposal of Great Britain to reduce the maximum limits of the various classes of battleships from the limit of 35,000 tons established at Washington to 25,000 tons or even 22,000 tons (with a simultaneous reduction of the maximum calibre of the guns from 16 inches to 12 or 11 inches), and cruisers from 10,000 tons to 7,000 tons (simultaneously reducing the outside calibre of their guns from eight inches to six inches) is equally inacceptable for America. As we know, this proposal is connected with the efforts of the British Empire to make the fullest use in the future war of its enormous advantages in the shape of a world system of naval bases and coaling stations, and also the biggest merchant fleet in the world, which forms an enormous reserve for the navy.

An important factor for the naval conference to be held in 1935, as for the previous London conference in 1930, is the naval rivalry of France and Italy. We know that this has made it impossible for France and Italy to take part in the London Naval Treaty, since the claims of Italy for "parity" with its "Latin sister" in all forms of armaments conflict with the efforts of France to ensure that its navy will be superior to that of Italy. And if in Europe, at the present time, the Franco-Italian contradictions have somewhat subsided in face of the growing German danger, they remain with their former force in respect to naval armaments.

II. INCREASED NAVAL CONSTRUCTION ARMAMENTS

While diplomatic negotiations on the naval conference are taking place in London, the powers participating in these negotiations are increasing their navies without losing time.

The program advanced by Japan at the London negotiations, as far as it concerns Japanese naval armaments, is already being carried out in practice.

The first and second programs of Japan for "supplementing the navy", adopted respectively in 1930 and 1933, in reality not only bring the Japanese navy up to the Washington and London limits for all categories of vessels, but considerably exceed the limits set for Japan. These programs, all told, provide for the construction of six cruisers with six-inch guns, two aeroplane carriers, 26 torpedo boats, and 15 submarines of various types, not counting every possible kind of auxiliary vessels.

In addition to this, an extensive program is being carried out on the construction of ships such as are not limited by the existing naval agreements. This group includes the three big ships for the transport of hydroplanes, two oil tankers, at least a score of torpedo cutters, a large number of coastguard ships, submarine destroyers, etc. In addition, secret naval armaments are being carried on, in particular the construction of miniature submarines of a special type and also parts for submarines of the usual type, so that they can be put together in case of war.

Naval aviation is being feverishly increased, being strengthened to 39 squadrons, *i.e.*, almost three times as many as existed at the moment when the first program for the "supplementing of the navy" was adopted. In connection with the forthcoming annulment of the Washington and London restrictions, the Japanese naval ministry and the general staff is secretly preparing a gigantic new program of armaments which they will begin to carry out in the near future. Without anticipating the details of this program, it is not difficult to imagine its extent, because the naval expenditures voted by Japanese imperialism for the next year have been increased compared with the present year to a tremendous degree.

In 1934 the official appropriation for the Japanese naval department consisted of 487,000,000 yen, and for the army 450,000,000 yen—record figures for peace times—but the budget for the forthcoming year demanded by the leading Japanese army and naval authorities comprises at least 700,000,000 yen for the navy and 600,000,000 yen for the navy. These figures have a significance which increases if we take into account the exceptionally low expenses of production in Japan, in view of the extreme cheapness and exploitation of labor, and they reflect the tempo of the armaments of Japanese imperialism and its feverish preparations for new wars. Under such con-

ditions the conference to be held in 1935 is being looked upon by the leaders of Japanese policy as an arena for the struggle for the most favorable position in the forthcoming war conflicts, and as a new stage on the path towards the further unlimited strengthening of Japanese armaments.

AMERICAN NAVAL ARMAMENT RACE

The practical measures taken by the U.S.A. to increase its navy correspond in full to the position which it has taken up before the conference. President Roosevelt and his assistants are trying in the briefest possible period to bring the American navy up to the Washington and London limits for all kinds of vessels. Even during the year 1933, it began to carry through a new special shipbuilding program providing for the construction of two aeroplane carriers of 20,000 tons, four cruisers with six-inch guns, of 10,000 tons each, four destroyers of 1,850 tons, 16 torpedo boats of 1,500 tons, and four submarines of 1,300 tons. Simultaneously, in 1933-34, work has been started on the construction of two cruisers of the "Washington type" (10,000 tons with eight-inch guns), which are respectively the 16th and 17th ships of this class for the American navy, and four other destroyers which were included in the earlier programs.

The naval program for the year 1934-35 provides for the building of still another cruiser of the Washington type (the 18th and last of this class allowed to the American navy by the London treaty), three cruisers of 10,000 tons with six-inch guns, two destroyers, twelve torpedo boats and six submarines. The contracts for the building of all these vessels were completed in August, 1934, and building work has already started. The naval program for 1934-35 comprises the first year of an extensive shipbuilding program which was adopted by the U.S. Congress in March, 1934, under the name of the Winson Bill, which aims at bringing the American navy up to the limits established in London within five years.

At the present time the naval department has already adopted a shipbuilding program for the next financial year, 1935-36, which will be presented to Congress for confirmation immediately the sessions are renewed. This program provides for the construction of still another aeroplane carrier of 15,000 tons (which reaches the limit set in the Washington naval treaty for this type of vessel), two cruisers of 10,000 tons with six-inch guns (these vessels are officially intended to replace two of the existing ships of this class which will pass the age limit in 1937 and 1938, inasmuch as the limit of tonnage fixed for the American navy in the cruiser class by the London naval treaty will already be reached by the program of the present year), three destroyers and six submarines.

In order to reach the maximum limits established by the London Naval Treaty, the United States must lay down, according to the Winson Law, during the next three budget years (1936-37, 1937-38 and 1938-39), another 36 torpedo boats and 18 submarines, which will amount to 12 torpedo boats and six submarines annually. Not being satisfied, however, with feverishly increasing its navy in the classes of light vessels, and foreseeing the inevitability of the annulment of the Washington Treaty, and the end of the "breathing space" which it allowed in the construction of battleships, the American naval department is drawing up plans at the present time for ships of this class, so that in case of necessity it can start work on them in 1937.

The leading American naval circles, like those in Great Britain, still look upon the battleships as the basis of the fighting power of the navy. Admiral Reeves, the biggest American naval authority, who has just been appointed Admiral of the U.S. Navy, pointed out that battleships still remain the strongest fighting element of the navy because they have the greatest offensive power and can bear more serious damage than any other type of vessel. A navy without battleships, he stated, would be helpless against a navy which possessed them. At the present time designs are being prepared for two types of battleships of the maximum tonnage permitted by the Washington Treaty, *i.e.*, 35,000 tons each—battleships with 16-inch guns, corresponding to the British "Nelson", and an armored cruiser with an enormous speed armed with 14-inch guns.

The preparations for the building of big fighting units for the American navy are taking place parallel with measures intended to secure the greatest possible increase in the newest type of armaments—aviation. According to the Winson Law the American naval air fleet (both on the ships and on the shore) will be increased to 2,184 first line aeroplanes, not including reserves (compared with the present number of 1,000 aeroplanes, as decided in 1926). Simultaneously (according to the report of the Becker Commission, which is now under consideration by the American government), it is proposed to increase the number of aeroplanes attached to the army from the present 1,800 first line planes to 2,320. While increasing its armed forces in the air, the United States is simultaneously taking steps to create the greatest possibilities for utilizing these forces in the future wars. In particular, this is connected with the exploring of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands in order to decide on the points where bases must be formed in the near future for military aviation and also for the light naval forces.

If complications should arise on the Pacific Ocean the strategic significance of these potential bases is extremely great. These bases are located about 2,00

miles from the chief Japanese islands, while the distance of the latter from the chief Pacific base of the American navy in the Hawaiian Islands is 4,000 to 5,000 sea miles. The significance of the relatively narrow northeastern part of the Pacific Ocean lying between Japan on the one hand and the Aleutian Islands and Alaska on the other, will steadily increase along with the growing radius of action of bombing planes. Of special significance are the maneuvers of the American naval and air forces which are to be held next year in this very part of the Pacific Ocean.

As we know, the American naval maneuvers this year took place in the Caribbean Sea. In connection with this, the main forces of the American navy were temporarily transferred from the Pacific naval bases to Atlantic stations. At the present time, however, the entire American navy has again been transferred to the Pacific Ocean. The Pacific bases are becoming permanent stations, not only for ships of the line, but also for the American reconnoitering fleet (cruisers) and also for a large part of the submarine flotilla and the auxiliary units. Thus the intensification of the situation in the Far East is more and more riveting the attention of the leaders of American naval policy and strategy to the Pacific Ocean.

BRITISH NAVAL ARMAMENTS

In the near future Great Britain intends not only to start constructing the light forces of the navy at a forced rate, but also to build battleships. The latter are still looked upon by the responsible leaders of British naval policy as the basic fighting power of the navy. Plans for the construction of battleships, which are intended after 1936 to replace the existing units of this class in the British navy, are already being worked out by the British Admiralty.

In addition to this, British imperialism is beginning to make considerable increases in its armed forces in the air. In the last few years British imperialism has been creating an unparalleled base for the air forces of the British Empire, with exceptional consistency and plan. This world system of aviation bases, numerous aerodromes, air lines, linking up the various parts of the British Empire (the air line England-India-Australia, England-South Africa, the proposed air line from England to Canada through Greenland, etc.), considerably augments and duplicates the world system of British naval bases. And now, having formed an unparalleled base organization for its air forces, Great Britain is beginning this year to carry out a "five-year plan" in the sphere of increasing the numbers of its air forces. The latter are being increased by 41 squadrons, *i.e.*, the number will reach approximately 135 squadrons. Out of this number, 75 squadrons will be stationed in the home countries, while the remainder will be stationed in the colonial possessions of the British Empire. The power of the British aviation industry will ensure the possibility of the rapid development of the air forces in case of war.

FRANCO-ITALIAN NAVAL RIVALRY

Franco-Italian rivalry in armaments applied until recently only to the light forces of the navy and to aviation. At the present time it has spread to the domain of battleships. It is true that when France laid down its first armored cruiser "Dunquerque", of 26,500 tons with 13-inch guns, in 1932, Italy temporarily refrained from responding to this measure. But when the French Naval Minister, Pietrie, carried a bill through parliament this year providing for the commencement of a second armored cruiser of the same type, the "Strassbourg" (simultaneously another torpedo boat and two submarines are being laid down), Mussolini replied by announcing that Italy intends to put down two battleships of the maximum tonnage permitted by the Washington agreement, *i.e.*, 35,000 tons each.

Simultaneously with the adoption of the plan for the construction of the two new battleships, the Italian government granted considerable sums for the strengthening of naval aviation. In reply to this, France is adopting a four-year plan, providing for the strengthening and improvement of its naval aviation, the construction of underground fuel reservoirs which are safe against air attacks, the construction of new coast batteries in Morocco, and other measures in the sphere of war preparations in the Mediterranean.

Naval circles in England, as well as the English press, took a very unfavorable attitude to the decision of Italy to build big battleships, because this went directly against the proposals to reduce the extreme dimensions of vessels of this class which England puts forward at the forthcoming conference. In connection with this the British press expresses the hope that Italy is only putting forward this decision as a reserve, trying in this way to secure the maximum concessions on the question of the relationship of forces between its navy and the French navy in respect to lighter vessels. In any case the Franco-Italian naval rivalry is a factor which very strongly affects the position of Great Britain, which finds itself in sufficiently complicated conditions even without this in determining the basic lines of its naval policy, having before it two main rivals — the ocean powers, the U.S.A. and Japan.

THE REBIRTH OF THE GERMAN NAVY

This rivalry is complicated at the present time by a new factor in the form of the rebirth of the navy

of Germany. The re-arming of German imperialism has so far mainly taken the line of land and air armaments. Fascist Germany formally kept within the limits of the Versailles Treaty in respect to naval armaments. This was done deliberately in order to avoid friction with Great Britain and to ensure the friendly neutrality of the latter in view of the re-armament of Germany which was in preparation. This is demonstrated without a doubt by the memorandum of Hitler, presented two years ago to the then Chancellor Von Papen. The memorandum included the program of German fascism on this question which has been carried out ever since Hitler came to power.

But as the military power of Germany rises, the question of increasing its naval armaments comes on the order of the day. During the present year the second "pocket cruiser" of the "Deutschland" type, the "Admiral Scheer", has been added to the German navy. Simultaneously a third unit of the same type, the "Admiral Count Spee", was launched. In the future, Germany proposes to pass on to the construction of bigger units of this class, exceeding the dimensions set by the Versailles Treaty. The plans and designs for the new dreadnoughts and also for the aeroplane carriers, submarines and vessels of other classes which Germany is forbidden to build according to the Versailles Treaty, have, according to trustworthy information, already been worked out. In some German factories the parts for submarines are already being made on a mass production basis and preparations are being made to assemble them. The World War showed what tremendous possibilities Germany possessed in respect to the rapid production of this type of naval armament.

At the same time Germany is becoming a factor with which the chief naval powers will have to reckon to an increasing degree in view of the forthcoming naval conference. There is no doubt that if Germany is invited to this conference, its representatives will take advantage of the opportunity and will again put forward, as was done at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the question of the "equality of rights" for Germany in respect to naval armaments, on th level with other powers. And this, in turn, will hav to serve as a suitable screen for the actual forth coming rebirth of the German navy.

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Such are the basic lines of the naval policy of th chief countries participating in the forthcoming con ference and their contradictions, which are increasin and by no means smoothing down on the eve of th calling of the conference. In such circumstance prophecies about the conference, not only regardin the reduction of naval armaments but of any restric tion whatever for naval armaments, can only be ex tremely pessimistic. The chief political interest o the conference, moreover, does not consist in the re duction of armaments. The central question will b the distribution of forces which will be determine at the conference and which will play an extremel big role in the international situation in the nex few years, and in particular for the speed of th preparations for, and for the setting of the date of the coming wars.

For the Soviet Union which is steadily conductin its policy of peace and simultaneously strengthenin its defenses in view of the provocations which th imperialists are preparing, the conference will also without question, have great interest. Owing to this the public and the press of the Soviet Union pay th most serious attention to it and must carefully watch all the tendencies which appear, even during the pro cess of the preparations for the conference, and which will undoubtedly come out even sharper at the con ference itself. The Communist Parties in capitalis countries and all friends of the Soviet Union abroad must watch the course of the forthcoming conferenc with equal care, because one outcome or another of this conference will lead to new important change in the international situation, in the preparations for new wars.

The war danger—and we must not forget this for a moment — means first of all the danger of war against the Soviet Union.

HOW TO PREPARE FOR THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

By A. BERG

THE decisions published below of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P. of Germany, and of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia, are devoted *to the most important question* now facing all Sections of the Comintern, namely, that of *preparation for the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International.* The reso lution adopted by the Presidium of the E.C.C.I on September 5, 1934, regarding the postponement of the calling together of the Seventh Congress, from the second half of 1934 to the first half of 1935, makes it possible for, and obligatory on, all Sections

of the Comintern to carry through all-round preparations for the Congress, and to arrange for a deep discussion of the questions facing the Communist Parties in each separate country.

In its resolution adopted, the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. set the following tasks:

> "The periodical, *The Communist International*, and the Communist press of the various Sections, must at once commence to examine the questions forming the agenda of the Seventh World Congress.
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> "The Sections of the Communist International must take up in their Party organizations the discussion of the questions on the agenda of the Seventh Congress, taking into account the lessons and experiences of their struggle and work since the Sixth World Congress."

Preparations for the Congress have already begun in the various Sections of the Comintern, but we have to record that to date there is a *lag behind* in the speed at which these preparations are taking place, and in the scope of these preparations.

We therefore consider it a merit of the Central Committees of the C.P.'s of Germany and Czechoslovakia that they have been the first to publish the decisions of their Parties regarding the carrying through of a broad *discussion* of the questions which will be on the agenda of the World Congress. The C.P. of Germany is carrying on its activity in the most difficult conditions of illegality. It is carrying on a heroic struggle in conditions where the most bestial fascist dictatorship reigns, and, out of the depths of its illegality, it is rousing the masses to overthrow this dictatorship and establish Soviet Power in Germany. All the greater, then, is the importance of the fact that the C.P. of Germany has been first to set about the discussion of the problems facing the Congress.

At the same time we set ourselves the task of indicating the defects from which these documents suffer.

In the decision published, attention is drawn to the two indissoluble tasks facing the Parties, namely, the discussion of the most immediate political questions of the particular country which have been brought forward on the eve of the Congress, and, at the same time, the necessity "of introducing their share into the discussion of the important international questions facing the world Communist movement". It is perfectly clear that the Communist Parties can correctly indicate the revolutionary prospects and tasks facing their particular countries only in the light of the general revolutionary prospects and the strategic and tactical tasks facing the Comintern in the oncoming historic period, and if they thereby bear in mind the lessons and the experience of the struggle in their own particular country.

Whereas the Sixth Congress of the Communist International indicated the prospects of the shattering of the relative stabilization of capitalism, and indicated the foundation for the prospects of a growth of a revolutionary upsurge throughout the world, and of the preparation for decisive battles, the Seventh Congress, on the other hand, will determine *the prospects of the second round of revolutions and wars,* when both the task of preparing for decisive battles and the prospect of the most decisive struggles of the proletariat in a number of countries, as well as the importance of the main slogan of the Comintern, namely, that of Soviet Power, come to the fore with the utmost force.

This strategic prospect determines our basic *tactical task*, namely, that of *organizing the united front* for the struggle against fascism, war, and the capitalist offensive, and, along these lines, of leading the masses to the decisive struggles *for Soviet Power.*

The Seventh Congress will analyze the new features in the decline of world capitalism, the new processes going on in the ranks of the working class and of the toilers of the capitalist and colonial countries. It will sum up the results of the world historic victories in the Soviet Union. It will determine the influence of these victories on the development of the world revolutionary movement. It will indicate the further prospects of the ripening of the world revolutionary crisis. It will determine our tasks and the forms of struggle against the growth of fascism, against the growth of the danger of war, a struggle developing into the direct struggle for Soviet Power.

The profound processes which have taken place have determined the crisis of international Social-Democracy, the crisis of the Second International, whereas Communism has increased its influence throughout the world. The mighty victories of the U.S.S.R., the growth of fascism, the danger of war and the crisis of Social-Democracy have determined *the turn of the masses towards the united front of struggle,* and have created an unheard-of urge towards the united front. This renders it necessary to introduce alterations into the tactics of the united front, to indicate new tactics to correspond to the new conditions, and to alter *the forms and methods of our struggle* against Social-Democracy.

At the same time, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern will, on the basis of sharp Bolshevik self-criticism, sum up the results of the international Communist movement in the period between the two Congresses, and will estimate the successes, sharply raising the question of the weak sides of the world Communist movement, and of the work of the different Sections of the Comintern. The Congress will determine the lines to be taken and the tasks to be solved for the further Bolshevization and Bolshevik education of the Sections of the Comintern, and the

tasks facing the struggle on two fronts—against all variations of opportunism, and against the Right danger as the main danger in the Comintern throughout the present period.

We must draw attention to the fact that in the documents we publish, *insufficient* attention is drawn to these basic questions, whereas in preparing for the Seventh Congress these questions must be placed in the center of our attention.

The leadership of the C.P. of Germany acted quite correctly in attempting to formulate definite themes for discussion in connection with the Seventh Congress. The C.P. of Czechoslovakia did not do this, unfortunately, in its resolution. The resolution of the C.P. of Germany states:

> "We want to include for discussion all the questions of the practical work of the Party and the working class, all the new events of German and world policy."

However, the themes indicated in the resolution of the C.P. of Germany are, in our opinion, *of an insufficiently concrete* character, and do not concentrate attention on the immediate questions which are now being sharply brought right to the forefront on an international scale, and especially on the immediate questions facing Germany.

The first group of questions is that of *the revolutionary prospects in Germany, the prospects of the growth of the difficulties facing the fascist dictatorship, and the unleashing of the struggle against it.*

It is essential that the following questions be widely discussed in this connection:

1. How is the ripening of the revolutionary crisis going on in Germany? What forms are assumed in Germany by the fact that "the idea of storming capitalism is ripening in the consciousness of the masses"?

2. At the July Presidium meeting of the E.C.C.I., it was stated, on the basis of the report made by the representatives of the C.P. of Germany, that the events of June 30 indicated *the beginning* of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship. (Note that, as distinct from this, the document of the C.P. of Germany refers on several occasions to the "crisis of the fascist dictatorship".) It is essential that discussion take place on the question as to how the beginning of the crisis of the fascist dictatorship of the German bourgeoisie shows itself, and what further processes in this direction have taken place following the events of June 30.

3. What was responsible for hindering the Party from making adequate use of June 30 for the wide mobilization of the masses against the fascist dictatorship?

4. What possibilities are there for German fascism to maneuver at a time when its mass social basis is being narrowed?

5. What is the character of the contradictions in the camp of the bourgeoisie and how should the C.P. of Germany utilize them? What are the features of the growing resistance to fascism, both in the camp of the proletariat and on the part of the peasantry and of the urban petty bourgeoisie?

6. What are the growing economic difficulties facing German fascism and how catastrophic has been the worsening of the conditions of the toilers?

7. What is the present condition of the wave of chauvinism, and what are the conditions and tasks for the successful struggle against it?

8. Is there any reality about the prospects of the fascist regime becoming "democratized"? That is to say, how real is the prospect of the leaders of Social-Democracy and of the trade union bureaucrats being drawn into collaboration by the fascist government?

The second group of questions is linked up with the question of the processes going on within German Social-Democracy, and with our tasks in connection therewith. We must, by developing discussion, answer a series of disturbing questions:

1. Why is it that, in spite of the overwhelming bankruptcy of German Social-Democracy, we still have not succeeded in winning the majority of the members of the Social-Democratic Party and the workers who follow them?

2. How must we differentiate our tactics in relation to various groups within German Social-Democracy, so that we may utilize the new processes taking place inside Social-Democracy, and so as to extend the united front and to increase our influence over the Social-Democratic masses?

The third of the group of questions deals with the most important questions facing the C.P. of Germany.

1. We must first of all note that in the resolution of the C.P. of Germany the question is not raised as to how to solve the strategic task of winning the majority of the working class under illegal conditions, under the fascist dictatorship.

2. The resolution does not pose the question as to why the German fascists have succeeded, in the conditions of the most profound economic and agrarian crisis, in drawing the majority of the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie to their side. On what scale and in what forms is the departure of these petty-bourgeois masses from fascism taking place, and what tasks face us in connection with the winning of allies of the revolution to our side?

3. One of the central questions facing the C.P. of Germany is the following:

How is the united front to be organized, what stands in its way, and what obstacles in this connection have to be overcome?

4. How are mass illegal trade unions to be organized in the conditions prevailing under the fascist

regime? A solution has to be given to the problem of the free trade unions, the question of the revolutionary trade union opposition and the Red trade unions.

5. What tasks face us and what methods of work have to be undertaken in the mass fascist organizations; and the problem has to be solved of the utilization of legal possibilities and the penetration of the bounds set by illegality.

6. What are the tasks facing the all-round struggle against the feverish preparations of German fascism for counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union?

While we do not set ourselves the task of exhausting the whole sum of questions we do not deal with a number of other important questions, particularly those indicated in the resolution of the C.P. of Germany (the national question in Germany, the fight for the youth, the methods of organizational and political leadership in the conditions of the fascist regime, and the experience of the big local organizations, etc.).

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, as is correctly pointed out in the resolution regarding the preparations for the Seventh Congress, is now faced with a task which cannot at all be postponed, namely, that of preventing the establishment of an open fascist dictatorship in Czechoslovakia. And this renders it obligatory for the C.P. of Czechoslovakia to organize a broad united front against the fascist offensive, against war and all forms of the capitalist offensive.

The C.P. of Czechoslovakia must undertake a broad discussion of all the problems appearing on the agenda of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and will have to give Bolshevik replies to the immediate problems arising in the present situation in Czechoslovakia. The C.P. of Czechoslovakia will also have to determine and publish a number of the most burning questions, including, in addition to the task of preventing the establishment of a fascist dictatorship and the tasks of organizing the united front, particularly and especially the problems of trade union unity. The following immediate questions will have to occupy a very foremost position:

1. How can the struggle for partial economic and political demands and the struggle against the fascist offensive be better linked up in the tactics of the Party with the revolutionary prospects of the struggle for power?

2. Why is it that, in spite of all the acts of treachery committed by the Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia, the majority of the working class still follow it, and why is it that we have not yet succeeded in achieving a decisive turn in the organization of the united front? We must solve the problem of our counter-arguments against the Social-Democrats and particularly against the ideology of the "defense of democracy" which the Czechoslovakian Socialist Parties make wide use of in the case of Czechoslovakia, which is surrounded by fascist countries (Germany, Austria and Hungary).

3. What place is occupied by and what part is played by the national question in Czechoslovakia and in particular as regards the consolidation of the influence of the reformist ideology?

4. The big Right opportunist mistakes committed in the C.P. of Czechoslovakia must forcibly face the Party with the task of carrying through a discussion of the problems facing the Seventh Congress in the closest connection with the struggle against the following: against the Social-Democratic influence which penetrates the C.P. of Czechoslovakia, against the democratic illusions regarding the Masaryk republic, hiding of the political face and role of the Communist Party, against the theory of a Socialist-Communist government, etc., and against the Right-wing danger as being the main danger in the C.P. of Czechoslovakia. The document produced by the C.P. of Czechoslovakia does not rally the attention to these most important questions.

The resolution of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia correctly indicates the following tasks facing all the Parties carrying on preparations for the Seventh Congress:

> ". . . Our task is to make a most careful analysis of our experience of struggle since the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and to verify the policy, tactics and slogans of our Party from the point of view of stabilizing and organizationally consolidating our influence over the toilers, and mainly over the working class, from the point of view of the political growth and education of our Party forces. . . ."

In both resolutions attention is correctly drawn to the fact that the problems facing the Seventh Congress are problems facing not only the Communists, *but the whole of the working class,* and, in particular, the Socialist working masses, who are more and more breaking with their leaders and turning towards the Communist International. But we must remember of course, that *the first and basic task* is to rouse our own ranks for preparations for the Congress, and give the necessary instructions to the Party organizations and leadership in a discussion of the questions in preparing for the Seventh Congress.

We stress once again that very little time remains before the Congress comes together. The Sections of the Comintern must hurry up with the carrying through of preparations for the Congress. But this is little, this is not enough. It is time already that a beginning be made on the pages of the entire international Communist press of the publication of the materials in connection with the Congress and that a lively discussion be begun.

THE C.P. OF GERMANY ON THE DISCUSSION FOR THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS

(Decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P.G. on the Conduct of the Discussion for the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern.)

THE Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P.G. welcomes the decision of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. to conduct a broad discussion among the members of the Party and the working class on the questions facing the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern.

The Political Bureau proposes that all Party bodies and Party fractions in the mass organizations undertake the discussion of these questions, thoroughly developing the problems of the German and international working class movement and drawing into this discussion broad masses of workers, especially our Social-Democratic class comrades who are inspired by a firm will to establish unity in struggle and action.

The profound changes that have taken place in economic and political life in the last stage of the development of the capitalist dictatorship have brought about, esecially in Germany, changes in class relations and in the conditions of the class struggle which make it necessary to change, improve and give greater flexibility to the forms and methods of our tactics.

The German problem is becoming one of the chief questions facing the Seventh Congress. In the sphere of foreign policy, Hitlerite fascism uses the language of adventures, bloody and fatal diplomatic intrigues and unceasing provocations, so as to be able tomorrow to make open use of the language of the cannon.

In the sphere of home policy the mailed fist of terror is let loose against the toiling people so as to make it easier for monopolist capital to plunder the masses. Charitable soup kitchens, political chicanery in the form of "winter aid," merry-making journeys organized for some of the "elect" by the "Strength in Joy" society—all these are only a pitiful fig leaf covering the ceaseless civil war directed by the fascist dictatorship against the working class and all sections of the toilers.

The crisis of the fascist dictatorship, caused by the strengthening determination of the working class to struggle and to bring about unity, by the narrowing of the mass basis of fascism, by the partial battles, and the movement to resist fascism that is beginning in various forms, along with the growing economic weakness of German monopolist capital—this crisis of the fascist dictatorship faces the C.P.G. with the great task of bringing about unity of action and the unity of the working class, and to rally the forces of all sections of the toilers for the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship and the establishment of Soviet Power.

The Party must immediately rouse and organize the exploited masses for joint struggle, for joint action against the fascist labor law, against the reactionary regulations in the factories, against the expulsion of the youth from the mills and factories against compulsory labor service, and against all the various kinds of militarization measures being carried through by the bourgeoisie, and against the preparations for war.

Our struggle is further directed against the incessant cuts in wages and worsening of labor conditions against high prices and against the social, political and cultural measures forcibly operated by the fascists. We advocate and organize the struggle for increased wages, and for the liberation of all imprisoned anti-fascists and of our comrade and leader Thaelmann. It is precisely the frantic anti-Soviet incitement to war being employed by German fascism which particularly demands of us the organization of a wide front in defense of the Soviet Union.

We wish to create, in the course of joint struggle and joint action for the fighting demands of the toilers, relations with our Social-Democratic class brothers, founded on confidence, which grow ever closer, and more comradely. We aim at unification in the process of the joint struggle with all our Social-Democratic class comrades and groups of them on the basis of the program of the Communist International.

The appeal of the Communist International to the Second International regarding the united front which contained the concrete proposal that haste be made to undertake joint activity in aid of the heroically fighting Spanish workers and peasants, the repeated proposals of our German Party regarding the establishment of unity in struggle and action, together with the Social-Democratic comrades and the groups in which they come together, the organization in practice of a whole series of joint movements of resistance, and the organization of joint trade union groups which has already begun in some places and which has given good results, testify to the firm determination of the Communist International and the German Communist Party to overcome the split in the working class and to crush our common enemy fascism, by means of joint activity.

The revolutionary upsurge which is growing wide

and deeper in the capitalist countries found its expression in the heroic February battles of the Austrian proletariat, in the heroic insurrectionary fights of the Spanish workers and peasants, in the successes of the united front in France and in the Saar, in the enormous strikes in America, in the barricade fighting at Amsterdam, in the defeat of Hitlerite fascism at the "trustee" elections, in the August plebiscite, and in the wave of proletarian resistance to the fascist policy of plunder.

The inspiring victories of the Red Army of Soviet China and the triumph of Marxism-Leninism which has already become a reality, transforming the world on one-sixth of the globe thanks to Socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., provide the workers of all countries with a powerful source of energy and strength in their struggle for freedom and Socialism. Under the banner of Marx and Engels, and led by the iron Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Stalin, the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. have achieved victory after victory in defiance of all difficulties. On the eve of the anniversary of the heroic October Revolution, we recognize our profound community of revolutionary sentiments, and greet the toiling people of the fatherland of all the oppressed and its leader, the C.P.S.U., directed by the great helmsman, Comrade Stalin.

Our theory, which has gathered strength owing to the tremendous victory achieved by the Bolsheviks, owing to the theoretical behests of Lenin and to the lessons provided by Stalin which enlighten the path day by day, must be the basis for our discussion and the thread which runs through our practical work for the victory of the proletarian revolution in Germany.

By elaborating problems, and by utilizing the rich experience of the proletarian class struggle, we want to strengthen our Party and thereby the working class, to inspire them with new energy to defend the vital interests of the toilers in town and village, to draw the youth into the victorious struggle for the overthrow of the capitalist dictatorship and the establishment of Soviet Power, and to win over the middle strata of the population in the towns and the toiling peasants, as allies of our class.

We want to include for discussion all the questions of the practical work of the Party and the working class, all the new events of German and world policy.

We must draw the Social-Democratic and religious workers and the comrades from every kind of trade union into participation in our discussion and do so on as wide a scale as possible, so that, by improving our tactics and continuing to use our Bolshevik strategy, it will be possible for us to bring about unity in the struggle and the unity of the working class.

The problems facing the Seventh Congress of the Comintern are the problems facing the entire working class, and at the same time are those facing the exploited middle strata and the toiling peasants.

The Seventh Congress is a congress of struggle for unity of our class. The questions which will be raised at the Seventh Congress are the questions of struggle against a murderous war; the questions of this world conference of the workers and the oppressed of all countries are questions of the victory of our class, of the elimination of capitalist wage slavery and the victory of Socialism.

Let us conduct the discussion on these questions with the proud realization of our international and class power, with firm determination, based on Bolshevik self-criticism and a tireless struggle on two fronts—against Right opportunism and its "Left" variety—as we were taught by that true disciple of Stalin, our Ernst Thaelmann. Let us learn again and again from the Bolsheviks to rally the masses around our Party with revolutionary insistence and firmness, and we shall create the prerequisites for the victory of our class, and the establishment of Soviet Power in Germany.

QUESTIONS TO BE DISCUSSED AT THE SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMINTERN

Taking as its starting point that the C.P.G. cannot in any way limit itself to German questions but must make its contribution to this discussion of the chief international questions facing the world Communist movement, the C.C. of the C.P.G. puts forward the following questions as the basic points for discussion:

1. The tendencies of the development of the capitalist system in general.

2. The special kind of depression and the forms in which it appears in Germany.

3. The question of the inter-relations between fascism and Social-Democracy.

4. The crisis of the Second International and the role of Social-Democracy in the altered situation in Germany.

5. The role of Germany as the main instigator of war in Europe, and the application of Leninism in present-day conditions.

6. The statement of our program on the question of national and social liberation, on our attitude to Versailles and to the Saar question. The national question and proletarian internationalism.

7. The importance and utilization of the successes of Socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and of the existence of Soviet China for the anti-fascist liberation struggle, and for the struggle for Soviet Power in Germany.

8. The Bolshevik struggle for unity of action and the unity of the working class.

9. The objective conditions for the proletarian revolution and the role of the subjective factor.

10. Trade union questions and our mass work. Problems of the illegal trade unions, and work in the fascist mass organizations.

11. Our Bolshevik struggle on two fronts against opportunism.

12. Questions of the prospects of development.

13. The crisis of the fascist dictatorship and the changes in the mass basis of fascism.

14. The problem of the allies of the proletarian revolution.

15. The special role of the youth in the struggle against war and fascism.

16. Practical organizational problems facing the illegal and semi-legal Parties.

17. Work among the armed formations of the bourgeoisie. The working class and the problem of self-defense.

THE C.P. OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA ON THE DISCUSSION FOR THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS

(Resolution of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia on Preparations for the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern.)

THE Executive Committee of the Comintern has decided to convene the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in the first half of 1935, and has given instructions that, in order that it should be thoroughly prepared, a broad discussion be set in motion in all the Sections of the Comintern on the problems placed on the agenda of the Seventh Congress. The Political Bureau of the C.C. of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia welcomes the decision of the Executive Committee of the Comintern to conduct a broad discussion in preparation for the World Congress, and calls on all the members of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia to take a most active part in the preparations for, and the discussions connected with, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern.

The Seventh World Congress of the Third International will be a Congress of *struggle for united action by the working class* against fascism and the danger of imperialist war—a Congress which, at a moment of tremendous political intensity, will lighten the path and show the world proletariat the path along which it must travel to obtain its liberation.

In preparation for the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, our task is to make a most careful analysis of our experience of struggle since the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern, and to verify the policy, tactics and slogans of our Party from the point of view of stabilizing and organizationally consolidating our influence over the toilers, and mainly over the working class, from the point of view of the political growth and education of our Party forces and their ability to conduct a struggle in defense of the interests and rights of the toilers.

The check-up of the entire work of the Party must be conducted especially from the point of view of its work to restore the united front of the proletariat and to bring about the unity of the trade union movement on the basis of the class struggle.

At meetings of Party functionaries and Party members, the experience and lessons of the work we have conducted so far must be taken into consideration, and discussion must take place of the tasks facing the C.P. of Czechoslovakia in connection with the economic and political situation in Czechoslovakia, and in connection with the relationship of the forces of the classes and Parties, so as to develop the revolutionary mass movement from all sides and to bring it to victory. It is important in this connection first and foremost to study and fulfill the tasks which are necessary for the establishment of a broad, powerful united front of anti-fascist struggle, so as to prevent the victory of fascism in the Czechoslovakian Republic, and so as to develop the anti-fascist counter-offensive on a wide scale in the struggle for the political rights, liberties and vital interests of the toiling masses.

The problems facing the Seventh Congress are not only the problems facing the Communists, but are also *those facing the entire working class,* and especially the *Social-Democratic* working masses. The Social-Democratic workers themselves are more and more becoming convinced that the leadership of the liberation struggle of the proletariat does not belong to the Second International. The Second International is in a state of complete disintegration. It is a conglomeration of bankrupt leaders, ministers to royal monarchies and bourgeois capitalist States, leaders who tie up and suppress the revolutionary elements still existing in their ranks. The Second International is a hindrance in the path of the international proletariat, and not its leader.

The leader of the international proletariat, in its struggle for liberation, is the *Third, Communist, International.* In its hands is the future of the international working class and of the toilers of the entire world. The Third International solves the problems facing the toilers and points out the path to be taken. It also solves the problems which are now exciting the Social-Democratic workers. The Social-Demo-

cratic workers must therefore take an active part in the discussion and in the preparations for the Seventh Congress of the Comintern. The Political Bureau of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia calls on them to participate in the preparation of the decisions to be taken by the revolutionary staff of the international proletariat—the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International.

Consider the problems facing the Seventh Congress of the Comintern and discuss them among yourselves, in your organizations, and also with our Social-Democratic class comrades. Send your views as a contribution to the discussion, to the C.C. of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia, which will see to their publication! Carry through the discussion concretely and fundamentally! Link up the preparations for the Seventh Congress with the strengthening of the C.P. of Czechoslovakia, with the recruiting of thousands of new members into the ranks of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia!

THE "FRANKNESS" OF CALVO SOTELLO

By ARVIKTO

AFTER the October battles of the Spanish proletariat, Calvo Sotello spoke in the Quartesse. Sotello, the former Minister of Finance under the Berenger dictatorship, is one of the ideologists and leaders of the monarchist-fascist party "Renovacion Espanola" ("Spanish Renovation"), and a well-known Spanish monarchist and fascist who is closely connected with the fascist party "Falanga Espanola" organized by Primo de Rivero's son.

Sotello's speech is of considerable interest. Moreover, only a few days ago, Sotello, together with a group of 140 people, signed a declaration on the organization of a "national bloc".

What are the main demands of Spanish fascism as expressed by Calvo Sotello?

First, the establishment of an open fascist dictatorship, and the liquidation of the parliamentary system, because parliament is only a dialogue. And at present a dialogue between many of the social elements in Spain is impossible. A dialogue pre-supposes a certain similarity in viewpoints. "Two people, whose viewpoints are absolutely different either polemize with each other with the help of firearms or do not polemize at all since they do not want to speak to each other." We must establish a corporative and authoritative State which will solve all questions by means of a plebiscite and will not use the method of "parliamentary comedy".

Second, the army must occupy one of the most important places in the State. "The honor of the army is the same as the honor of Spain." The army is the "backbone" of the State. Further, if this "backbone" bends, breaks, or is destroyed then together with it Spain is also destroyed. It is further proposed to cancel the paragraph of the Constitution which bans military officers from occupying the post of President. "Our Republic, the President of which cannot be an officer, has now been saved by a few generals, officers and soldiers." At the present time, one must "reckon only with the strong". Therefore, "to avoid being merely a decoration in Geneva" we must prepare for war. Moreover, the "export of oranges, grape juice and olive oil to a great extent depends upon the possession of submarines, aeroplanes, and military forces by the government, *i.e.,* the elements necessary to obtain definite weight on the international arena".

Third, the national question should once and for all be taken off the order of the day and the autonomy of Catalonia, which is really an anomaly, should be liquidated. "Sr. Lerroux must once and for all put an end to these exercises in autonomy."

Fourth, all laws limiting the privileges of the Church must be cancelled and the full privileges of the Church be restored.

Fifth, it is necessary to take the most decisive measures of repression against the participants in the October struggle.

These are, in the main, the demands of the most outspoken group of Spanish fascism.

Calvo Sotello, besides this, offers a number of other curious observations on the position in Spain.

The revolution in Spain, declares Sotello, has not been destroyed because "its roots are still hidden in the broad masses of the Spanish population". The revolutionary elements not only refuse to consider themselves defeated, but, on the contrary, *they have morally considerably strengthened their position.* "The revolutionary elements feel that they are being supported and defended by some force which as yet cannot be defined. Something and some one very mysterious in nature, some magic fluid, coming from unknown heights affects all those who approach it and *binds them to treachery to their fatherland*". Therefore, "people are talking about coming strike struggles as if this was a very natural thing".

But how does Sotello explain the existence of revolutionary sentiments among the masses? In his opinion the explanation is that the "Lerroux government has not sufficient power to overcome, de-

stroy and crush the rebel elements and bring about a situation that no other power can rise side by side with the government and exercise moral influence, especially if this power is illegal and driven underground".

To dream about the parliamentary system, about the possibilities of attracting the Socialists to participation in the government, according to Sotello, is an impossible thing at the present moment. It would be an illusion, he considers, to think that the leaders of the Socialist Party are in a position to appeal to the masses with the demand to stop the revolution and choose the road of peaceful struggle in municipalities. In his struggle for the open fascist dictatorship, in the struggle for the abolition of parliament, Calvo Sotello is prepared to depict the Socialist Party of Spain as a "party of revolution" and as "no longer in the Second International". This is not true, of course. The Socialist Party and the anarchists are responsible for the fact that the Spanish proletariat did not conquer in the October fighting. And, the Socialist Party of Spain, as before, finds itself in the lap of the Second International and not the Third International. But the important thing is that Calvo Sotello is forced to recognize the tremendous Leftward swing of the Socialist workers and that these masses are moving in a direction away from parliamentarism.

"The Socialist Party has shown itself as a party of revolution. It is already no longer in the Second International. Notwithstanding its formal adherence to this International, it actually belongs to the Third International, no matter what Besteiro and other leaders of the Spanish revolutionary party may say. *The Socialist Party is the masses, not the leaders.* And these masses will never return to Parliament. If they do return it will be only to organize obstruction."

Finally, this Spanish fascist in the course of his speech approves of the conduct of the Social-Democracy of Western Europe which "does not encourage class struggle in the form of violence".

The British workers should read these words and see what high praise Spanish fascism has for the Labor Party which turned down the Communist Party's offer for united front. Sotello, who in Spain demands the abolition of a parliamentary system and the destruction of "democracy" in any form, is delighted with the British parliament. He declares:

"The British parliament has functioned wonderfully because there was a common understanding between all sections of the population of Britain. This common understanding exists even at present: the British Socialist Party denounces violence and does not recognize anything but democracy . . . it declares that it will not take power except through the ordinary channels of democracy, that it will take power only when the majority of the population are on its side and then it will put its teachings into pracice."

What is the significance of this speech? It confirms once more that the Spanish working class has not been defeated, that after losing the October battles it is preparing for the new struggle for power.

From this frank admission of the enemy, the Communist Party must draw the conclusion of the necessity of developing and carrying out struggles in the most varied forms, in order not to give the existing government the chance to consolidate its power.

The speech only advances all the demands and plans of Spanish fascism and places before the Communist Party the task of mobilizing the masses for the struggle against these fascist attempts.

The Communist Party must strengthen its work of winning over the majority of the Spanish working class. There are all possibilities for the fulfillment of this task. It is along these lines that the Communist Party of Spain will be transformed into the only mass Party of the Spanish proletariat.

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